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In R v Sharpe, the Supreme Court of Canada read in a “private use exception” to the offence 
of possessing child pornography. The Court reasoned that youths’ self-created expressive 
material and private recordings of lawful sexual activity—created by, or depicting the accused 
and held by the accused exclusively for private use—would pose little or no risk to children 
and may in fact be of significance to adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization, sexual 
exploration, and identity. Fundamental changes in the technological, social, sexual, and legal 
landscape since Sharpe have resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the exception’s scope. 
Federal and provincial police and federally funded child protection agencies now regularly 
inform young people that they do not have the legal right to consensually create and share 
their digital sexual images with an intimate partner. Scholarly opinion on the exception’s 
application to teenage sexting is under-considered and varied, and subsequent judicial 
interpretations of the exception have extended the boundaries of private use while also 
circumscribing the protection by requiring youth to retain the ability to “maintain control” 
of their images. Via a mapping of our new technological and legal landscape, as well as a 
consideration of shifting privacy, communication, and sexual norms, this article examines 
and clarifies the application of the private use exception to teenagers’ contemporary digital 
sexual expression practices. This article argues that the private use exception as set out in 
Sharpe is inclusive of consensual teenage sexting in private yet is too narrow to adequately 
protect the sexual speech of teens. While subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception 
have extended the boundaries of private use, these analyses have also potentially and 
paradoxically circumscribed the protection by requiring youth to retain the ability to “maintain 
control” their own images. A key goal of this article is thus to interrogate the relationship 
between privacy and control as it relates to youths’ consensual sexual expression. Finally, 
this article argues that future considerations of the parameters of the private use exception 
incorporate an analysis of the benefits of sexual expression for young people as well as a 
positive sexual rights framework that recognizes the autonomy of youth who are of legal age 
to consent to sexual relations. 
IN 1995, CANADA CUSTOMS AGENTS stopped Robin Sharpe—a middle-aged, gay, 
retired city planner—and seized from his luggage his self-authored text entitled 
“Boyabuse—Flogging, Fun and Fortitude: A Collection of Kiddiekink Classics.” 
Sharpe was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography.1 The 
following year, police laid more charges after searching Sharpe’s residence and 
1. R v Sharpe (1999), 169 DLR (4th) 536 at para 3 [Sharpe BCSC]; R v Sharpe, 1999 175 
DLR (4th) 1 (BCCA) [Sharpe BCCA]; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 163.1. Child 
pornography is defined in s 163.1(1): 
 163.1 (1) In this section, “child pornography” means
 (a)  a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was made by 
electronic or mechanical means,
   (i)  that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years 
and engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or
  (ii)  the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, 
of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen years;
 (b)  any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or counsels 
sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence 
under this Act;
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seizing his private and unpublished stories, as well as 10 photographs of what 
Sharpe described as “two nude blond boys in their late teens, gay lovers at the 
time, hugging, kissing and hamming it up for the camera.”2 
Facing the stigma of being labelled a child pornographer, and vaguely aware 
of the criticisms that followed the then newly created child pornography laws, 
Sharpe decided to challenge the constitutionality of the definition of child 
pornography and the simple possession provision set out in s. 163.1 of the Code.3 
In 1999, both the British Columbia Supreme Court and the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal agreed with Sharpe, in part, and struck down the possession 
provision as a violation of his right to freedom of expression.4 In 2001, the 
Supreme Court of Canada similarly determined that criminalizing the possession 
of child pornography infringed on Sharpe’s right to freedom of expression, but 
held that this infringement was nevertheless justified under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because of the need to protect children 
from harm.5 Having determined this, however, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, 
writing on behalf of the majority, also acknowledged that the prohibition 
“captures in its sweep materials that arguably pose little or no risk to children, 
and that deeply implicate the freedoms [of expression] guaranteed under s. 
2(b).”6 To address this over-breadth and to maintain the constitutionality of our 
child pornography laws, the Court “read in” a “private use exception” to the 
offences of making and possessing child pornography.7 This private use exception 
would apply to two classes of materials: “(1) Self-created expressive material: i.e., 
any written material or visual representation created by the accused alone, and 
 (c)  any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual 
purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an 
offence under this Act; or
 (d)  any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, presentation 
or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of 
eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act.
2. Ibid at paras 3-4; Robin Sharpe “R vs. Sharpe Personal Account”, online: <robinsharpe.ca/
rvssharpe1.html>.
3. Sharpe BCCA, supra note 1 at paras 3-5.
4. Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1 at para 83; Sharpe BCCA, supra note 1 at paras 215-18.
5. R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 [Sharpe]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Charter].
6. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 105. See also ibid at para 120.
7. Ibid at paras 114–20. In 2008, then Chief Justice McLachlin clarified that “the effect of 
granting a constitutional exemption would be to so change the legislation as to create 
something different in nature from what Parliament intended” (R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 
6 at para 50). 
(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL304
held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or her own personal use; and 
(2) Private recordings of lawful sexual activity: i.e., any visual recording, created 
by or depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity 
and is held by the accused exclusively for private use.”8 The Court elaborated 
further and wrote: “[F]or example, a teenage couple would not fall within the 
law’s purview for creating and keeping sexually explicit pictures featuring each 
other alone, or together engaged in lawful sexual activity, provided these pictures 
were created together and shared only with one another.”9 The Court reasoned 
that not only would these materials “pose little or no risk to children,” but they 
also “may be of significance to adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization and 
sexual exploration and identity.”10 
Much has changed in the technological, social, and legal landscape since 
Sharpe was originally decided. As has been the case historically, technological 
developments have contributed significantly to shifts in communication, privacy, 
and sexual norms.11 With increasing access and affordability, camera-equipped 
smartphones, social networking, and an expanded digital realm have 
fundamentally changed how, where, and the extent to which adolescents and 
adults maintain friendships, flirt, hook up, date, have sex, break up, and generally 
communicate with one another.12 While self-produced and distributed sexual 
images are by no means a new practice, the ease, amount, scope, purpose, and, 
8. Ibid at para 128. The use of “i.e.” in both instances indicates that these examples are not 
necessarily exhaustive.
9. Ibid at para 116.
10. Ibid at para 109. Outcry following the Sharpe decision resulted in reforms to our child 
pornography laws—including the addition of our current transmission, exporting and 
accessing offences, as well as changes to the available defences. See Sara M Smyth, “A 
‘Reasoned Apprehension’ of Overbreadth: An Alternative Approach to the Problems 
Presented by Section 63.1 of the Criminal Code” (2009) 42 UBC L Rev 69 at 87-89.
11. For the purposes of this article, digital technology and communication technology are used 
interchangeably.
12. Amanda Lenhart, Monica Anderson & Aaron Smith, “Teens, Technology and Romantic 
Relationships” Pew Research Centre (1 October 2015), online: <www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2015/10/01/teens-technology-and-romantic-relationships>; Amanda Lenhart 
& Maeve Duggan, “Couples, the Internet, and Social Media: How American Couples 
Use Digital Technology to Manage Life, Logistics and Emotional Intimacy within Their 
Relationships” Pew Research Centre (11 February 2014), online: <https://www.pewresearch.
org/internet/2014/02/11/couples-the-internet-and-social-media/>; McAfee, “Study Reveals 
Majority of Adults Share Intimate Details via Unsecured Digital Devices” (4 February 2014), 
online: McAfee <http://www.mcafee.com/ca/about/news/2014/q1/20140204-01.aspx>.
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to some extent, the meaning of sexual pictures created and shared by those under 
the age of eighteen has changed in the digital age.13 
The goal of this article is to examine the application of the private use 
exception to digital communication practices and products—specifically, 
to teenagers’ “sexts” that comprise nude, semi-nude, or sexually explicit images, 
videos, and text messages consensually created and shared by youth under the age 
of eighteen via cellular and wireless networks.14 At the time that the private use 
exception was drafted, the Court likely envisioned two teens, together physically 
in a defined offline context—such as a bedroom or other private space—using a 
recording device such as a camera or camcorder. In our digital context however—
with the development of camera-equipped smartphones, messaging applications, 
and wireless networking—proximity, physical sexual contact, and celluloid are 
no longer conceptualized as necessary for teens (or adults) to “participate in the 
sexual activity” or to “create [images] together.”15 Indeed, a growing body of 
research demonstrates that young people experience the creation and sharing of 
nudes as flirting and foreplay, and many teens as well as adults are choosing to 
sext instead of engaging in, or in combination with, offline sexual relations.16 
In this digital context, two teens whose texts to one another become increasingly 
flirtatious and, at some point, involve the creation and digital sharing of nude 
images are, arguably, both participating in the sexual activity in question.17 
The Court in R v Sharpe makes it clear that the exclusion for private recordings 
of unlawful sexual activity applies to the making and possessing of such material 
13. Digital is used in this article “to emphasise that our lives are inextricably linked with 
interactive, networked, remixable and ubiquitous media.” Sonia Livingstone, “Why 
label our time and life digital?” (26 May, 2015), LSE Department of Media and 
Communications (blog), online: <blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digitalfuture/2015/05/26/
why-label-our-time-and-life-digital>. 
14. “Sext” is used interchangeably with “nude image” “nude” or “intimate image”. This article 
also considers non-consensual distribution of consensual sexts given that, as is argued below, 
the teasing apart of consensual and non-consensual distribution is more complex than is 
often acknowledged. 
15. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 116.
16. Terri Day, “The New Digital Dating Behavior—Sexting: Teens’ Explicit Love Letters: 
Criminal Justice or Civil Liability” (2010) 33 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 69; Julie Cupples 
& Lee Tompson, “Heterotextuality and Digital Foreplay: Cell Phones and the Culture of 
Teenage Romance” (2010) 10 Feminist Media Studies 1; British Pregnancy Advisory Service, 
“Social Media, SRE, and Sensible Drinking: Understanding the Dramatic Decline in Teenage 
Pregnancy” (May 2018), online: <http://www.bpas.org>.
17. Indeed, the exception, if read narrowly, may actually require physical proximity and sexual 
contact in order for youths’ sexual expression to be deemed significant sexual exploration or 
important for their self-actualization and identity.
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but not to its publication or distribution.18 That is, the private use exception will 
not apply to any material that is transferred to a person other than its creator 
or a participant in its creation.19 However, subsequent interpretations of the 
exception expand the definition of “participant” and recognize the role of “digital 
sharing” in our contemporary cultural and technological context, thus effectively 
extending the exception to include the “transmission” or “distribution” of child 
pornography.20 While successive courts have considered the scope of the private 
use exception, none have directly considered the consensual teenage sexting 
scenario.21 As Karaian has argued elsewhere, this is likely due, in part, to police 
and prosecutorial discretion and constraint.22 Nevertheless, scholarly opinion 
on the exception’s application to this practice is under-considered and varied. 
Whereas Lara Karaian and Andrea Slane have both argued that youths’ digital 
sexual expression is captured by the exception,23 others have suggested that the 
exception would arguably not apply to sexts that are shared with a remote partner 
“because the recipient neither participated in the creation of, nor is depicted in, 
the recording,” therefore disqualifying the images and the young people from 
inclusion.24 Moreover, lack of clarity regarding the exception’s application to 
sexts has resulted in confusion about young peoples’ constitutionally protected 
expressive rights.25 Since 2005, federal and provincial police and federally funded 
child protection agencies have been informing young people that they do not 
have the legal right to consensually create and share digital sexual images with an 
intimate partner and that doing so could result in child pornography charges.26 
18. Sharpe, supra note 5 at paras 116-118.
19. Ibid at paras 116, 118.
20. R v Keough, 2011 ABQB 312.
21. One exception is R v Schultz, 2008 ABQB 679 at para 129, wherein Justice Topolniski drew 
on a hypothetical and argued that the private use defence would not apply to a teenage 
female who took explicit photographs and shared them with others via the Internet.
22. Lara Karaian, “Policing Sexting: Responsibilization, Respectability, and Sexual Subjectivity 
in Child Protection/Crime Prevention Responses to Teenagers’ Digital Sexual Expression” 
(2014) 18 Theoretical Criminology 282.
23. Ibid; Lara Karaian, “Lolita Speaks: ‘Sexting,’ Teenage Girls and the Law” (2012) 8 Crime, 
Media, Culture 57; Lara Karaian & Katherine van Meyl, “Reframing Risqué/Risky: Queer 
Temporalities, Teenage Sexting, and Freedom of Expression Laws” (2015) 4 Laws 18; Andrea 
Slane, “Sexting and the Law in Canada” (2013) 22 Can J Hum Sexuality 117.
24. Joshua Sealy-Harrington & Ashton Menuz, “Keep It to Yourself: The 
Private Use Exception for Child Pornography Offences” ABlawg.
ca (23 June 2015), online: <https://ablawg.ca/2015/06/23/
keep-it-to-yourself-the-private-use-exception-for-child-pornography-offences/>.
25. For the purposes of this article, young people—those between the ages of twelve and 
eighteen—are referred to interchangeably with youth, adolescents, and teens. 
26. Karaian, supra note 22 at 282. 
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One such example is the Saint-Jérôme Police Service, which was awarded the 
2017 Minister of Justice National Youth Justice Policing Award for its anti-sexting 
campaign: “Campagne sexton: reflète la bonne image de toi et pas obligé de tout 
partager.”27 Consensual sexting in this campaign is framed as self-exploitation 
and illegal.28 This project has established a strong media presence, including a 
commercial on the dangers of ‘sexting’ which has appeared over a thousand times 
at the Saint-Jérôme cinema. The project was also featured on the front pages of 
three local papers as well as in television and radio interviews.29 The effects of 
this activity on adolescents’ sexual expression, and the damaging effects of this 
policing for young peoples’ self-fulfillment, self-actualization, sexual exploration, 
and identity have yet to be adequately considered.
This article argues that the private use exception as set out in Sharpe is inclusive 
of consensual teenage sexting based on four grounds: the text and spirit of the 
exception; subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception; fundamental shifts 
in the technological and sexual terrain since the exception was established; and, 
recent material amendments to the Criminal Code—namely, the development in 
2015 of the Protecting Canadian’s from Online Crime Act (Online Crime Act) and 
its new intimate images provision, which makes non-consensual intimate image 
distribution a criminal privacy offence.30 Having said this, this article also argues 
that the private use exception as it currently exists is too narrow to adequately 
27. Department of Justice, “Minister of Justice National Youth Justice Policing Award” 
Government of Canada, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/nyjpa-pnmjj/2017.html>.
28. Ibid. This collaborative campaign (which also included the Canadian Centre for Child 
Protection, youth prosecutors in the province of Québec, and the Commission scolaire 
de la Rivière-du-Nord) disseminated its message via a “Sexto intervention kit for schools,” 
which, according to the Department of Justice press release, has reached over 10,000 
students since 2016.
29. Ibid. School resource officers across Canada have identified teenage sexting as a major 
part of their current work. Royal Canadian Mounted Police and provincial police have 
self-produced anti-sexting initiatives that disseminate this message across a variety of 
platforms. See also “Un Sexto, C’est Quoi?” Ville de Saint-Jérome, online: <www.vsj.ca/fr/
sexto.aspx>. The Châteauguay police’s “awareness campaign” titled “Sexts Are Porn” targets 
students aged twelve to seventeen and involves police visits to six schools to warn about 
the dangers of consensual sexting. “Châteauguay Police Launch ‘Sexts Are Porn’ Campaign 
to Rein in Teen Sexting” (25 January 2018), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/teen-sexting-ch%C3%A2teauguay-police-1.4502186>. (“The police have 
noted that, on average, since 2014, half of the child pornography files handled by the SPVG 
were associated with this phenomenon.” (English translation of French website, online: 
<http://www.gatineau.ca/portail/default.aspx?p=guichet_municipal%2fpolice%2fzone_
jeunesse%2fprogrammes_ecoles_secondaires%2fgarde_ca_pour_toi >).
30. Protecting Canadian’s from Online Crime Act, SC 2014, c 31; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, 
c C-46, s 162.1(1). 
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protect the sexual speech of teens. While subsequent judicial interpretations of 
the exception have extended the boundaries of private use, these analyses have 
also potentially and paradoxically circumscribed the protection by requiring 
youth to retain the ability to “maintain control” of their own images. A key goal 
of this article is thus to interrogate the relationship between privacy and control 
as it relates to youths’ digital sexual expression. 
In order to clarify the exception’s scope and its applicability to teenage 
sexting this article begins with a mapping of judicial interpretations of the private 
use exception from its inception in 2001 up to and beyond the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s most recent consideration of the defence in R v Barabash.31 From 
here, fundamental shifts in the technological and sexual terrain are charted in 
order to establish a chronology of technological developments and their effects 
since Sharpe. These technological and sexual shifts are then discussed in relation 
to changes in the legislative terrain, namely the development of new criminal 
law provisions that explicitly acknowledge young people’s ability to consent to 
sending intimate images of themselves to a peer, including to peers who did not 
“participate” in the image’s creation. This most recent legislative development 
reclassifies the non-consensual distribution of images that meet the definition 
of child pornography as a privacy violation, thus constructing youths’ digital 
sexual expression as ontologically other than child pornography.32 Next, privacy’s 
meaning, its parameters, and the safeguards required to protect and regulate 
it in our digital context are considered. Here the implication of “networked 
privates” and “context collapse” for the meaning of “private use” are discussed. 
It is argued that the near impossibility of maintaining control and the paradoxical 
implications of believing in “control” as a means of preventing harm, requires 
further consideration. A more nuanced “privacy calculus” is advanced. 
Finally, the article considers the ways in which the sharing of images, 
including non-consensual sharing, can be understood as a modern-day iteration 
of the sexual rumour mill. Reframing the sharing of sexts as sexual rumours, 
it is argued, has implications for how we understand the meaning and boundaries 
of privacy, control, and harm at the heart of the private use exception. The article 
concludes by suggesting that a consideration of the value of sexual expression 
and pleasure for youth is central to any calculation of the costs of classifying 
youths’ sexual expression as harmful to children and thus as outside of Charter 
protections. It is argued that any clarification of the parameters of private use 
must incorporate an analysis of the benefits of sexual expression for young people 
31. R v Barabash, 2012 ABQB 99 [Barabash ABQB].
32. Department of Justice, Cyberbullying and the Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, June 2013) at 18.
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and a positive sexual rights framework that recognizes the autonomy of youth 
who are of legal age to consent to sexual relations. Moreover, this article argues 
that risk of harm posed to children by adolescent sexting does not outweigh 
the countervailing right of youths’ freedom of expression, and that adolescent 
sexting has a legitimate purpose despite being unrelated to the administration of 
justice or to science, medicine, education or art. Finally, this article advances the 
position that even in the case of non-consensual distribution of consensual sexts, 
child pornography charges are at best ill conceived and at worst unconstitutional. 
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRIVATE USE 
EXCEPTION: FROM SHARPE TO BARABASH 
Parliament’s main purpose for banning the production, distribution, and 
possession of child pornography is the prevention of harm to children and the 
need to send a message to Canadians “that children need to be protected from 
the harmful effects of child sexual abuse and exploitation and are not appropriate 
sexual partners.”33 The Court in Sharpe notes that Parliament set its targets on 
clear forms of “child pornography”: “depictions of explicit sex with children, 
depictions of sexual organs and anal areas of children and material advocating 
sexual crimes with children.” It did not, however, “cast its net over all material 
that might conceivably pose any risk to children or produce any negative attitudinal 
changes” but, rather, only over material that poses a reasoned risk of harm to 
children and, even then, only where the countervailing right of free expression or 
the public good does not outweigh that risk of harm.34 
As noted above, in an effort to remedy a law that the Supreme Court of 
Canada deemed “substantially constitutional and peripherally problematic,” the 
Court chose to “read into the law an exclusion of the problematic applications of 
s. 163.1.”35 Chief Justice McLaughlin read two provisions as being an exception 
to the possession of child pornography. She writes:36 
 … In this case, s. 163.1 might be read as incorporating an exception for the 
possession of:
1. Self-created expressive material: i.e., any written material or visual representation 
created by the accused alone, and held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or 
her own personal use; and
33. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 34, citing House of Commons Debates, 34-3, No 16 (3 June 
1993) at 20328.
34. Ibid at para 34 [emphasis added].
35. Ibid at para 114.
36. Ibid at para 115.
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2. Private recordings of lawful sexual activity: i.e., any visual recording, created by or 
depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is 
held by the accused exclusively for private use.
The first category, the Court notes, would capture materials such as a teenager’s 
confidential diary or any other written work or visual representation created by, 
and possessed by, a single person for their sole use.37 The second category “would 
protect auto-depictions, such as photographs taken by a child or adolescent of 
him-or herself alone, kept in strict privacy and intended for personal use only.”38 
According to the Court, the activity recorded must be legal in that it must be 
consensual and must preclude the exploitation or abuse of children. In addition, 
all of the parties must also have consented to the creation of the record, and the 
person possessing the recording must have personally recorded or participated in 
the sexual activity in question.39 
Following the 2001 Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Sharpe, the four 
counts of child pornography possession filed against Sharpe were remitted for 
trial with the newly formed private use exception defence in place. The Crown 
submitted that Sharpe’s impugned stories contravened section 163.1(1)(b) of 
Criminal Code, which makes illegal any written material or visual representation 
that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen. 
In 2002, Justice Duncan Shaw of the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
acquitted Sharpe of all charges pertaining to the written materials.40 He held that 
within criminal law the threshold is elevated to material that actively induces 
an offence against children, which he did not find to be true of the stories in 
Sharpe’s possession. With respect to the impugned images, Sharpe argued that 
they depicted legal sexual activity between youth (at that time, the age of consent 
was fourteen)41 and, thus, met the prongs of the newly established defence under 
the private use exception. Justice Shaw, however, found no evidence that the 
photos were in fact kept in strict privacy. Referring to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s previous decision and its reiteration that “the protection afforded by this 
exception would extend no further than to materials intended solely for private 
use. If materials were shown to be held with any intention other than for personal 
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at para 116. In both instances, the use of “such as” indicates that the example is 
not exhaustive.
39. Ibid.
40. Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1. 
41. The age of consent in Canada was raised to sixteen in 2008. Much of the case law cited 
herein refers to fact scenarios involving fourteen- and fifteen-year olds who were legally able 
to provide consent at the time that the incidents occurred.
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use, their possession would then fall outside the exception’s aegis and be subject 
to the full force of s. 163.1(4),”42 Justice Shaw found that “the photographs must 
be intended for the private use of the parties depicted within.”43 Thus, he found 
Sharpe guilty on all counts relating to the photographs. 
The issue of private and personal use was central to the next interpretation of 
the exception, six years after it was originally drafted. In 2007, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal delivered its decision in R v Dabrowski, wherein a twenty-eight-year-
old male, who pretended to be nineteen, engaged in an intimate, five-month-long 
relationship with a fourteen-year-old female.44 During the relationship, the couple 
filmed themselves engaging in sex acts alone and in front of the accused’s friends. 
When the relationship ended, Dobieslaw Dabrowski gave the physical videotape 
recordings to a friend for safekeeping. He was charged with uttering a threat 
by telephone, criminal harassment, and creating, possessing, and distributing 
pornography but was acquitted on all counts at trial. At trial, Justice Lynn Leitch 
of the Superior Court of Ontario reasoned that creation for private use did not 
mean that the tapes have to remain in the creator’s possession. Drawing on the 
definition of possession as set out in section 4(3) of the Criminal Code, Justice 
Leitch noted that “a person is in possession of an item when he knowingly has it 
in the actual custody or possession of another. The item is therefore in the actual 
possession of one person and attributed to the other.”45 Given the evidence that 
the “[tapes] were given to someone for safe keeping who did not watch them, 
who was asked not to watch them or show them to anyone,” Justice Leitch writes: 
“I am not satisfied that the video tapes were created or possessed with anything 
other than the intention for [private] personal use.”46
On appeal, the Crown argued that Justice Leitch erred when she applied 
the private use defence to a fact scenario wherein the materials were given to 
a third party who was neither a creator nor a participant. This interpretation 
of possession, the Crown argued, was overly liberal. In addition, they alleged 
that threats to distribute the materials were not adequately scrutinized by the 
trial judge and that these threats classified the materials as being beyond simple 
“personal use” and, therefore, outside of the protection of the Sharpe defence. 
Accepting this argument in part, Justice of Appeal James MacPherson referenced 
Sharpe and noted that, “[i]f materials were shown to be held with any intention 
42. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 118.
43. Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1 at para 19. 
44. R v Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619. 
45. Ibid at para 9.
46. Ibid.
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other than for personal use, their possession would then fall outside the exception’s 
aegis and be subject to the full force of s.163.1(4).”47 The issue of whether the 
accused created or used the videos in order to extort or threaten the girl was 
determined to be central to the determination of guilt and to the applicability of 
the Sharpe defence, and a retrial was ordered. However, with the case concluded, 
Justice MacPherson rejected the Crown’s “bright line” assertion that possession 
be exclusive and physical in order to qualify for the defence, stating instead: 
Although the “private use” exception should be applied with genuine caution, it 
goes too far to equate it in an absolute fashion with exclusive possession. Such an 
equation would render unlawful such activities as placing these videotapes in a safety 
deposit box or turning them over to a lawyer or other trusted person for safekeeping.
In my view, there is an evidentiary connection between holding relevant material in 
‘strict privacy’ and maintaining exclusive possession. It is a factual question whether 
giving up exclusive possession results in a loss of strict privacy. Each case must be 
assessed on its own facts. 48
To determine the circumstances in which another party may be in possession 
of the materials, Justice MacPherson enumerated a list of relevant questions:
Questions such as to whom was the material given, what was the purpose or reason 
for the transfer, what terms or conditions were agreed upon when the material was 
given up, what control did the accused maintain over the material, was the material 
in fact viewed by anyone other than the consensual participants, would be relevant, 
all in the context of the credibility of the accused and others. 49 
Justice Macpherson drew on a body of case law that interpreted private 
possession as “joint possession” requiring knowledge, consent, and some degree 
of control. Not only does this shift away from requiring strict physical possession 
and towards effective control, expanding the scope of what can be considered 
private materials, but it also, in effect, extends the scope of the exception to 
transmission or distribution of “child porn.” This right is extended further in 
subsequent case law with implications for teenage sexting’s constitutionality.
The first case to examine the private use exception as it pertains to the 
Internet was the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in R v Bono.50 
In this case, a fifty-two-year-old male who pretended to be a sixteen-year-old 
boy named “Marco” pursued an online relationship with the victim from when 
47. Ibid at para 24, quoting Sharpe, supra note 5.
48. Ibid at paras 29-30. 
49. Ibid at para 30.
50. R v Bono, 2008 CanLII 51780 (ON SC) [Bono].
KARAIAN, BRADY,  REVISITING THE “PRIVATE USE EXCEPTION” 313
she was fourteen until she was seventeen years of age.51 In 2002, when the victim 
was sixteen years of age, she videotaped herself masturbating and sent them to 
“Marco.”52 At the age of seventeen, she made three additional videos and sent 
them to another of Bono’s aliases, a thirty-eight-year-old man named “Anthony,” 
who would intervene to repair the deteriorating relationship between “Marco” 
and the girl. Over that time, thousands of online text-based communications and 
countless phone discussions transpired between the victim and the aliases created 
by the applicant.53 Having pled guilty to charges of possessing child pornography 
and child luring, Bono brought an application to strike his guilty pleas, arguing 
that he was not informed of the defence of private use. Justice Guy DiTomaso 
concluded that the private use exception did not apply based on the fact that 
“the applicant had not recorded the images nor had he participated in the sexual 
activity in question.”54 In addition, given that consent to engage in otherwise 
lawful sexual activity was vitiated by fraud, Justice DiTomaso concluded that the 
images depicted unlawful sexual activity and therefore failed another key prong 
of the private use test. Furthermore, the court reasoned that Bono’s conduct 
posed “a reasoned risk of harm to children” that would negate the applicability of 
the exemption.55 As such, the viability of the “private use” exemption as a defence 
failed, and the application to strike his earlier guilty pleas was dismissed.56 
It was not until the 2011 decision in R v Keough that the private use 
exception’s scope and application as a defence in a criminal matter was thoroughly 
considered, particularly as it relates to third-party possession.57 In this case, Jason 
Keough was charged with making and possessing child pornography, among 
other offences, after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police searched his home and 
seized a number of video recordings depicting the sexual activities between two 
young couples whom he had befriended over the course of his employment as 
a community youth worker and school guidance counsellor and as a roommate. 
In the first scenario of this case, fifteen-year-old S.C. and her eighteen-year-old 
boyfriend M.A. consensually produced a video recording their sexual relations 
solely for their own private use. Keough provided the video recording equipment 
51. Presumably using chat rooms, although details are not provided.
52. Presumably via a postal delivery service, although details are not provided.
53. Bono, supra note 50 at para 25. 
54. Ibid at para 24.
55. Ibid at para 26.
56. Ibid at para 24.
57. Keough, supra note 20 at para 295. Here, Justice Manderscheid concluded that the exception 
operates as a defence in law, such as self-defence or provocation. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, 
c C-46, ss 34-35, 37, 232. 
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to M.A. for making that recording. Initially, the recording of M.A. and S.C. was 
on a mini-cassette, but, upon M.A.’s request, Keough copied the mini-cassette 
recording to a VHS-format recording. The VHS-format recording was then given 
to M.A. However, M.A. and S.C. subsequently agreed that the VHS recording 
should be destroyed.58 M.A. reported that he had done so, but he testified that 
he gave Keough the VHS recording and requested that he destroy it.59 Keough, 
however, despite knowing S.C.’s age, proceeded to keep the original and produced 
two additional copies.60
It was determined by the trial judge that S.C. and M.A.’s recording qualified 
for the private use exception as they had recorded lawful sexual activities and the 
recording was created together.61 At appeal, the question considered by Justice 
Donald Manderscheid was whether “the format change and copying by a third 
party have the effect of removing the private use exemption.”62 From the evidence 
provided, Justice Manderscheid concluded that it did not.63 Functionally, the 
materials remained for private use even though the recordings of S.C. and M.A. 
were in the possession of a third party—namely, Keough—because they were 
not accessible by anyone other than the creators. Hence, the video’s “privacy” 
remained intact.64 The court concluded that M.A and S.C. must have consented 
to any collateral viewing of the recorded sexual episode that may have occurred 
during the format change.65 However, the court ultimately found that S.C. 
did not consent to Keough having ongoing possession of the recordings of her 
and M.A. and that this lack of consent removed this recorded material from 
the private use exception.66 As such, Keough was found guilty of possession of 
child pornography.67 
In the second scenario of the case, a couple that lived with Keough—
twenty-year-old C.V. and sixteen-year-old J.W.—video recorded themselves 
engaging in various sexual activities. At some point, Keough was provided with 
copies, but how or why he had come into their possession was not resolved 
by the court. Again, the question faced by Justice Manderscheid was whether 
58. Ibid at para 168.
59. Ibid at para 170.
60. Ibid at para 171.
61. Ibid at para 190.
62. Ibid at para 199.
63. Ibid at para 200.
64. Ibid at para 193.
65. Ibid at para 208.
66. Ibid at para 211.
67. Ibid at para 216.
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Keough’s possession could be caught within the scope of the private use 
exception. Since there was no evidence to suggest that J.W. had ever consented 
to the accused’s possession of the recordings, let alone on an ongoing basis, the 
defence was negated and Keough was found guilty. This finding thus reiterated 
that third-party possession can qualify as being functionally private and within 
the exception’s parameters as long as the image’s original creators have consented 
to it and effectively maintained control of the images. 
To arrive at these findings, Justice Mandersheid first summarizes the 
characteristics of private use material set out in Sharpe:
(1) all participants must consent;
(2) no exploitation or abuse may be involved;
(3) the sexual activity must be lawful;
(4) the person in possession must have either:
(a) been a participant in the recorded sexual activity or
(b) recorded the sexual activity. 68
Having done so, he points to Sharpe at paragraph 116 in order to map the 
scenarios to which the exception applies: 
(i) A records A for A,
(ii) B records A for A or B,
(iii) A or B records A and B for A or B, or
(iv) C records A and B for A, B, or C.
What the exception does not explicitly identify is the following:
(i) A records A for B, or
(ii) A or B records A and B for C. 69
This mapping is instructive for a few reasons. First, it makes explicit Justice 
Manderscheid’s earlier finding that “the private use exception would not seem 
to include a sexually explicit recording created by a young person on their own, 
and then provided to a second person who is an intimate, but who was not 
present when the recording was made” (the A records A for B scenario referenced 
68. Ibid at para 188.
69. Ibid at para 69 citing Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 116.
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above).70 The mapping also demonstrates that the constitutionality of sexual 
recordings of youths is not subject to a normative taste test given that consensual 
voyeuristic threesomes and the recording thereof (C records A and B for A, B, 
or C) are protected. As Justice Manderscheid notes, the exception as set out in 
Sharpe applies where one person records the sexual activities of a second person. 
He thus states: “I cannot see any principled reason where that would not also 
apply where two persons engaged in sexual activities and were recorded by a 
third.”71 He then goes on to note that 
it is not illegal for a person between ages 14 and 18 to engage in sexual activities in 
front of an observer. … The observation of those sexual activities is not, in itself, 
illegal, provided the young person consents to that viewing and there is no exploitive 
component (Criminal Code, s. 153) or conduct that attracts the other Criminal Code 
offenses which address morality or sexual activities (for example, Criminal Code, ss. 
151, 152, 163, 167, 173).72 
By recognizing and making explicit the constitutionality of the “C records 
A and B for A, B, or C” scenario, Justice Manderscheid reveals an important and 
false division between participating and recording. That is, by acknowledging 
the voyeuristic scenario, Justice Manderscheid recognizes the sexual nature of 
viewing—the fact that the recorder in the third-party scenario is implicitly 
recognized as also being a participant in the sexual activity and an owner of the 
expression that is produced in this context. Given this reasoning, the exclusion 
of a common sexting scenario from protection—namely, the “A records A for B” 
or the “A or B records A and B for C” scenarios—necessitates further analysis. 
Justice Manderscheid writes: 
It would seem very strange that an adolescent’s healthy sexual relationship and self 
actualization would not be reinforced by that adolescent making sexual recordings of 
themself, and then sharing those with their partner. … I conclude that to interpret 
the R v Sharpe private use exception to exclude that category of material possession 
and transfer would deny effective Charter relief by taking an “overly restrictive 
interpretation” of the scope of the private use exception identified in R v Sharpe.73 
Justice Manderscheid arrives at this conclusion in part by acknowledging 
how the shifting technological landscape facilitates such expression. He writes:74 
70. Ibid at para 189.
71. Ibid at para 206.
72. Ibid at para 207.
73. Ibid at para 276.
74. Ibid at para 277.
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[T]he kind of technology available to young persons today provides an 
unprecedented ability for young persons to record themselves privately and then 
share those recordings. A young woman may take a topless photo of herself on her 
cell phone and then send that to her boyfriend. Inside that kind of context I think 
the R v Sharpe private use exception could and should apply.
Thus, Justice Manderschied effectively extends the exception’s scope to 
include the “distribution” of “child pornography” if the sexual relations depicted 
are consensual and the recipient is deemed legally able to possess the material 
distributed to them, thus precluding scenarios involving exploitation or abuse.75 
Justice Manderscheid conceptualizes his interpretation as clarifying 
third-party possession, noting that the newly protected third-party possession 
exception would be negated in instances where possession was76 
(1) without the consent of all persons recorded;
(2) obtained by fraud or deception;
(3) a result of coercion, threat, or extortion;
(4) results in the loss of control of the private use material;
(5) in exchange for any form of consideration; or
(6) otherwise exploitive or abusive.
Keough thus clarified that “private use” materials can be shared with, or, put 
differently, distributed to, parties who were seemingly “not involved” in their 
creation, provided certain requirements are met and can be maintained. Again, 
“loss of control of the private use material” is explicitly reinforced as a key element 
of the standards required to mitigate risks of harm to children. According to 
Justice Manderscheid, effective control is lost when: “(1) the private use materials 
are transferred or used in a manner not authorized by the third party, or (2) 
the ‘owners’ of the private use materials are unable to demand the return of the 
materials or their destruction.”77 Despite his explicit acknowledgement of the role 
of technology in facilitating new sexual opportunities and modes of expression, 
Justice Manderscheid sidesteps the problem of maintaining control when it 
comes to new digital technologies. Thus, the relationship between privacy and 
maintaining control, and the impact of this requirement for the scope of the 
exception, is discussed in greater detail below. 
75. Ibid at para 283. 
76. Ibid at para 71.
77. Ibid at para 289.
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The next significant interpretation of the exception, and the first to deal 
specifically with social media and smartphones, is found in R v Cockell.78 Brian 
Cockell, who was twenty-eight years old, met the two female complainants, D.P. 
and D.C., on Nexopia, a Canadian social media site, when they were twelve 
and thirteen years of age respectively. He later exchanged cellphone numbers 
and began texting, meeting up with, and engaging in, sexual activities with 
both complainants separately. A number of sexual images and videos of D.C. 
were found on the accused’s various laptops and Blackberry cellphone, all of 
which were taken with her consent. At issue in Cockell’s appeal of two charges 
of possession and one charge of making child pornography was whether or not 
the trial judge properly assessed whether D.C. was fourteen years of age (the 
age of consent at that time) before engaging in sexual contact with the accused, 
thus rendering the sex consensual and making the private use defence potentially 
available to the appellant.79
The appeal court agreed with the defence submission that, due to unreliable 
testimony from D.C., inconclusive evidence from forensic meta-data experts, 
and no supporting submission from the trial judge, there was no reliable evidence 
to support allegations that the accused had engaged in sexual contact with 
D.C. before she was fourteen years old.80 The appeal court also acknowledged 
D.C.’s testimony that she had consented to the recording of the sexual activity.81 
However, Justice Myra Bielby of the Alberta Court of Appeal, in interpreting 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Sharpe, extended the exception’s 
requirements by adding two additional prerequisites to the availability of the 
defence. The first was that there must be a demonstrated “mutuality of benefit” 
for all of the parties involved with the materials and the second was that there 
must be a standalone analysis of a young person’s consent to ensure that their 
participation in creating the materials was given outside of potentially abusive or 
exploitative circumstances.82 The court then concluded that there was little or no 
mutuality of benefit for D.C. resulting from the creation of the materials, based 
in part on the fact that the materials were stored solely on computers owned by 
the accused as well as on D.C.’s testimony that she had taken the photographs 
“not for her own pleasure, but rather to send to the appellant when he was out of 
78. R v Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112 at para 112.
79. Ibid at paras 1-7.
80. Ibid at paras 26-27.
81. Ibid at para 11.
82. Ibid at paras 36, 38.
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town to cheer him up; she testified that she wanted to please him.”83 Justice Bielby 
then went on to cite the age difference between the two parties, the manner in 
which the relationship evolved, and the disapproval that D.C.’s parents showed 
for the relationship as evidence that the relationship was exploitative of the young 
female.84 Combined, these findings prompted the court to rule that,85
there is simply no evidence to establish the mutuality and the evidence which was 
led points to the existence of exploitation rather than contraindicates it. There is 
thus no “air of reality” to the appellant’s claim to the private use defence. Therefore, 
although the trial judge did not give reasons for the rejection of this defence, in the 
circumstances, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred so that the 
appeal on this ground must be dismissed.
Cockell’s leave to appeal this verdict to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
denied, and no reasons were provided. 
However, as Cockell was being decided, another challenge to the private use 
exception—R v Barabash—was working its way through the legal system and was 
ultimately heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015. In 2012, Donald 
Barabash, who was sixty years old, was charged with one count of possessing child 
pornography. Both he and the co-accused, Shane Rollison, who was forty-one 
years old, were also charged with making child pornography. The recordings at 
issue depicted the accused, primarily Rollison, engaging in a variety of sexual acts 
with the complainants, D. and K., two fourteen-year-old female runaways who 
had taken up residence in Barabash’s home. These recordings were discovered as 
the result of a police investigation of a sexually explicit image of D. and K. which, 
according to K.’s testimony, was created by D., using Barabash’s computer and 
web camera, and then posted online to Nexopia by D. without K.’s consent. D, 
however, was never charged with child pornography offences for these actions. 
It was determined by the lower court that the females were of legal age (at the 
time of the incident); that they were willing and consenting participants in the 
sexual acts and their recordings; and, that the accused did make and possess child 
pornography. The central question then concerned the applicability of the private 
use defence to the circumstances of the accused.86At trial, Justice Denny Thomas 
ruled that the private use exemption outlined in Sharpe had three requirements: 
(1) the sexual activity recorded must be lawful; (2) the recording must be made 
with consent from all parties depicted within; and, (3) the recording must be held 
83. Ibid at para 42. 
84. Ibid at paras 42-44.
85. Ibid at para 45.
86. Barabash ABQB, supra note 31 at paras 3-16. 
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for private use only by those involved in its creation.87 In doing so, he rejected 
the Crown’s interpretation of the exception as requiring that two separate and 
additional requirements be met—namely, that the images must also (1) have 
“self-actualizing” or “self-fulfilling” properties and, additionally, (2) be determined 
to not result from situations that could be viewed objectively as exploitative or 
abusive of children.88 Justice Thomas rejected this argument and concluded that 
“[t]his inquiry goes beyond whether the recorded activities are legal, consensual, 
and private, and instead requires investigation of the quality and meaning of those 
recorded activities.”89 Such a requirement, he argued, would constitute a morally 
driven “taste test,” which he deemed contrary to the court’s intent when creating 
the defence, adding:90
I observe that in R v Sharpe at para. 107 public perception is specifically excluded as 
a reason to criminalize recordings of teenagers engaged in sexual activities: ... “The 
fact that many might not favour such forms of expression does not lessen the need 
to insist on strict justification for their prohibition. As stated in Irwin Toy, supra, at 
p. 976, ‘the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing 
ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment.’”
Justice Thomas also commented on the court’s limited ability to fairly and 
objectively evaluate what is self-actualizing or expressive sexuality as an outside 
observer, and he highlighted a number of negative outcomes for youth should 
the Crown’s line of argument be accepted, such as enhanced criminal liability of 
young persons, reduced prosecutorial discretion, a lack of clear rules or guidelines 
for youth as to what is legal sexual activity, and the disproportionate or differential 
criminalization of marginal and minority youth.91 Dismissing these additional 
requirements as invalid, as well as the Crown’s arguments that a “synergy of 
negative factors”—such as drug use by the females, the young age of the females, 
the large age difference between the parties, and the nature of the sexual acts in 
the recordings—classify the recordings as being beyond the protection of the 
defence, Justice Thomas found the accused to have met the three requirements 
set out in Sharpe and acquitted both defendants.92
At appeal, the Crown relied on the ruling in Cockell to argue that the trial 
judge in Barabash erred in his interpretation of the private use defence. The 
majority of the court agreed and held that the private use exemption required 
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid at para 190.
89. Ibid at para 163 [emphasis in original].
90. Ibid at para 215.
91. Ibid at paras 251-68.
92. Ibid at para 10.
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a determination of “mutuality of benefit” for all of the parties involved in the 
creation of the materials. The appeal court also ruled in favour of creating an 
additional standalone requirement that the recorded material must “not involve 
child exploitation or abuse as cognizable in law generally, not just crimes under 
the Code.”93 The majority found that the trial judge had erred by not properly 
considering the exploitative circumstances surrounding the recordings and their 
creation and instituted guilty verdicts in place of the acquittals on all counts.94
The accused appealed and tasked the Supreme Court of Canada with clarifying 
the private use exemption’s requirements. Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, 
on behalf of a unanimous Court, disagreed with the appeal court’s interpretation 
of Sharpe and held that exploitation is a component of the lawfulness requirement 
and that no additional analysis of factual exploitation is required to qualify for 
the defence.95 Section 153.1 of the Criminal Code deems unlawful any sexual 
communications or activities with young persons that arise out of relationships of 
trust, authority, dependency, or exploitation. If unlawfulness due to exploitation 
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the private use exemption cannot be raised, 
regardless of whether or not the young person has consented to the activities 
and their recording. Justice Karakatsanis also highlighted that section 153.1(2) 
provides a list of some of the indicators a trial judge can consider when examining 
the presence of exploitation, such as (1) the age of the young person; (2) the 
age difference between the parties; (3) the evolution of the relationship; and 
(4) the degree of control or influence the person has over the young person.96 
In addition, Justice Karakatsanis disagreed with the Crown’s argument that 
the private use exemption requires evidence of a “mutuality of benefit” to all 
those involved in the creation of the materials. This, she argued, would add an 
unnecessary complication to the private use exemption; thus, she found that the 
determination of the material’s potential benefits was up to the lawful owners 
and creators.97 Having upheld the exception as set out in Sharpe, however, Justice 
Karakatsanis noted that the Court in Sharpe had not included any reference to 
the creator or participant’s right to maintain ongoing control or to the right to 
the return or destruction of the recording raised. She acknowledged that, while 
this issue was not relevant on the facts of the appeals before her:98
[i]t may well be that the right of a young person who participates in the recording 
to demand the return or destruction of the recording is also implicit in Sharpe’s 
weighing of the harm of child pornography against the values of self-expression and 
93. R v Barabash, 2014 ABCA 126 at para 36 [Barabash ABCA].
94. Ibid at paras 11-12.
95. R v Barabash, 2015 SCC 29 at paras 3, 39-41 [Barabash].
96. Ibid at para 36.
97. Ibid at para 52.
98. Ibid at para 30 [emphasis added].
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self-actualization (paras. 102–10). In my view, the balance struck between the right 
of free expression and preventing harm to children in Sharpe suggests that young 
persons who participate in a sexual recording caught by the private use exception 
retain the ability to ensure its return or destruction. This understanding of the 
exception would provide protection for young persons who may suffer anxiety or 
distress from the knowledge that another person possesses such material and could 
unlawfully share it. It would serve to address circumstances in which the risk of harm 
outweighs the expressive value of the recording, contrary to the principles articulated in 
Sharpe. However, since the question of a right to access or destruction is not relevant 
on the facts of these appeals, I would not make any final pronouncement about it.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that, while the 
Crown erred in law when attempting to institute additional requirements to the 
private use defence, its concerns about the possible exploitative nature of the 
relationship were warranted based on the age differences and the fact that the 
young females had a history of addiction and homelessness.99 In reviewing the 
facts of the case and the trial decision, the Court ruled that “the trial judge’s factual 
findings do not adequately establish whether the appellants were in positions 
of trust or authority towards the complainants, whether the complainants were 
dependent upon them, or whether the relationships were exploitative of K. and 
D., as required by s. 153,” and, as such, a new trial should be held to assess the facts 
of the case in light of the clarifications made to the role of exploitation in regards 
to the private use exemption.100 This case has not yet come to pass. Dabrowski has 
since died, and Rollinson is awaiting further action by the Crown.101
II. FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
SEXUAL TERRAIN 
Digital communication technologies existed when Sharpe was decided in 2001. 
However the evolution of digital and wireless technologies has fundamentally 
shifted the social and sexual terrain since then.102 These fundamental shifts 
necessitate a reconsideration and clarification of the private use exception’s 
borders, the relevance and possibility of “maintaining control” of one’s images, 
and of the balance between a right to expression and countervailing interests 
and harms. The majority in Sharpe did not reference the Internet in the body of 
their decision. The dissent, however, argued that “the widespread availability of 
computers and the Internet has resulted in new ways of creating images, and has 
99. Ibid at paras 54-55.
100. Ibid at para 61.
101. As per Dillon Brady’s correspondence with Rollinson’s attorney.
102. Lenhart, Anderson & Smith, supra note 12.
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facilitated the storage, reproduction, and distribution of child pornography.”103 
While the dissent’s claim about the widespread nature and availability of the 
Internet is valid, the Court was likely referring to evidence provided in the 
1999 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Sharpe, which referenced 
the scanning of images from print magazines or celluloid, saving these scans 
onto CD-ROMSs, JAZ drives, and disks, and distributing them via email 
and chat rooms.104 
While Canadians were world leaders in terms of Internet use in 2001, half 
of the adults in the United States (eighteen years of age and over)—more than 
ninety-four million people—did not have Internet access.105 Moreover, while 
about seventeen million US teens between the ages of twelve and seventeen 
were using the Internet in 2000 (73 percent), and thirteen million were using 
instant messaging, the PEW Research Center found that in 2001 the telephone 
remained the principle communication amongst teens.106 Ultimately, while 
the Internet and digital communication were emerging as a popular means of 
communication and expression for youth, the sea change in technology that 
has since swept over us had not yet materialized. Despite the fact that Mark 
Prensky coined the controversial term “digital native” in 2001 to refer to children 
who had grown up using digital technology, Prensky was referring primarily 
to youths’ use of video games and computers with precursors to the World 
Wide Web such as Bulletin Board Services and UseNet.107 These technologies 
predate the development of Web 2.0, user-generated content, camera-equipped 
smartphones, wireless networking, and social media. Indeed, the Web 2.0 gained 
103. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 166.
104. R v Sharpe, 1999 BCCA 416 at para 33. According to Detective Waters’s evidence to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
[t]he largest volume of material is being distributed through the use of the Internet, through 
computers—computer distribution. This can involve material that has been scanned from 
publications or pictures of children engaged in sexual activity. We’ve seen the older child 
pornography publications that were produced in Europe and Asia that are now showing up 
on computer and being distributed on the computers through the Internet. The pictures are 
scanned, which means that they are changed into an electronic format and placed on disk—
computer disk. … It’s been an electronic format on disk and then can be distributed through 
the computer, either through—which I stated earlier, through email or chat rooms or ICQ.
105. Media Awareness Network and the Government of Canada, “Young Canadians in a Wired 
World: The Students’ View” (2001), online: <http://mediasmarts.ca/sites/mediasmarts/files/
pdfs/publication-report/full/YCWWI-student-view.pdf>.
106. Amanda Lenhart, Oliver Lewis & Lee Rainie, Teenage Life Online (Washington, DC: 
Pew Research Centre, 21 June 2001), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2001/06/21/
teenage-life-online/>.
107. Mark Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1” (2001) 9:5 On the Horizon 1.
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prevalence after 2002, one year after the “dot-com” bust and the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Sharpe.108 
Wireless network capabilities did not develop in Canada and the United 
States until the mid-2000s. The first camera-equipped smartphones were released 
in 2000 and were far from affordable or ubiquitous.109 It was not until 2007 
that the first iPhone was released. Finally, the earliest social networking sites 
and video-sharing sites all came after 2001 and included Friendster (2002), 
Makeoutclub (2003), MySpace (2003), Nexopia (2003), Facebook (2006), 
and YouTube (2005).110 Many of these online platforms have since fallen out 
of popularity with youth and been replaced with newer applications such 
as Twitter (2006), Tumblr (2007), Instagram (2010), and Snapchat (2011). 
As these technologies have become more affordable and accessible, we have 
witnessed an amazing uptake in their usage and in how they have altered our 
modes of communication and expression. The PEW Research Center’s 2018 
survey, “Teens, Social Media and Technology,” found that smartphone ownership 
is now nearly universal among teens of different genders, race and ethnicities, 
and socio-economic backgrounds. These mobile connections “are in turn fueling 
more-persistent online activities: 45% of teens now say they are online on a 
near-constant basis.”111 
Such activity has increased from the PEW Research Center’s 2015 report 
examining teenagers’ use of social media and mobile phones to create, maintain, 
and end their friendships and romantic relationships, which determined that 
“[f ]ully 88% of American teens ages 13 to 17 have or have access to a mobile 
phone of some kind, and a majority of teens (73%) have smartphones.”112 Fully, 
108. Web 2.0 describes World Wide Web sites that emphasize user-generated content, usability, 
and interoperability. See Graham Cormode & Balachander Krishnamurthy, “Key Differences 
Between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0” (2008) 13:6 First Monday np., online: First Monday <http://
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2125/1972>. 
109. “Smartphone,” (2012) online: Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartphone>.
110. Facebook began as an internal application limited to Harvard University students. It was 
adopted by all US universities and became Facebook.com in August 2005. The network 
was extended to anyone with a registered email address in 2006. Sarah Phillips, “A Brief 
History of Facebook,” The Guardian (25 July 2007), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia>.
111. Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media and Technology (Washington, DC: 
Pew Research Center, May 2018), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/
teens-social-media-technology-2018/>.
112. Amanda Lenhart, Teen, Social Media and Technology Overview (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center, April 2015), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/
teens-social-media-technology-2015>.
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87 percent of American teens aged thirteen to seventeen have, or have access 
to, a desktop or laptop computer, and 58 percent of teens have, or have access 
to, a tablet computer.113 Overall, teens have relatively robust levels of access 
to technology devices, with seven out of ten teens having access to three or 
four of the five items asked about on the survey: desktop or laptop computer, 
smartphone, basic phone, tablet, and game console.114 The Pew Research Center’s 
2018 “Teens, Social Media and Technology” survey also concluded that “[t]he 
social media landscape in which teens reside looks markedly different than it did 
as recently as three years ago.”115
These new modes of communication are now widely used by adults and 
teens to make and maintain friendships, “hook up” (by facilitating offline sex), 
engage in digital intimacy or cybersex, date (often long distance), and break up 
with romantic partners.116 Online spaces now play a major role in how adults 
and teens flirt, pursue, and communicate with potential and current crushes.117 
In her “Six Facts about Teen Romance in the Digital Age,” Monica Anderson 
reveals that, “[a]lthough most teen romantic relationships do not start online, 
digital platforms serve as an important tool for flirting and showing romantic 
interest. Half of teens (50%) say they have friended someone on Facebook or 
another social media site as a way to show romantic interest, while 47% have 
expressed attraction by liking, commenting on or interacting with that person 
on social media.”118 When asked about a number of ways in which they might 
spend time with their current partner or significant other (or most recent past 
partner, in the case of teens who are not currently romantically involved but 
who have been in a relationship of some kind in the past), 92 percent of teens 
in romantic relationships have spent time text messaging with their partner at 
least occasionally; 70 percent have spent time together posting on social media 
sites; and 69 percent have spent time with their significant other using instant or 
online messaging.119 Other common ways in which teens have spent time with 
their romantic partners include video chatting (55 percent); using messaging 
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Anderson & Jiang, supra note 111 at 3. 
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid. 
118. Monica Anderson, Six Facts about Teen Romance in the Digital Age (Washington, 
DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), online: <http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2015/10/01/6-facts-about-teen-romance-in-the-digital-age/>.
119. Lenhart, Anderson & Smith, supra note 12 at 32.
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applications (49 percent), email (37 percent), and talking while playing video 
games together (31 percent).120
Numerous US and Canadian studies indicate that adults and youth now 
regularly use smartphones for creating and sharing sexual and nude imagery. 
A recent ongoing six-year longitudinal study of 964 ethnically diverse high 
school students in the United States concludes that “sexting is a new ‘normal’ 
part of adolescent sexual development and not strictly limited to at-risk 
adolescents.”121 A 2018 meta-analysis of thirty-nine sexting studies (with 
110,380 participants) determined that the observed increases in teenage sexting 
since 2009 corresponded to increases in smartphone ownership among teens.122 
Although rates of sexting are hard to determine due to the variance in definitions 
and sampling techniques,123 the 2018 meta-analysis found that about one in 
seven individuals (or 14.8 percent) between the ages of twelve and seventeen had 
sent sexts, and approximately one in four individuals (27.4 percent) had received 
them.124 These numbers mark a significant increase from the 2009 PEW Research 
Center’s findings of 4 percent and 15 percent of twelve to seventeen year olds, 
sending and receiving sexts, respectively.125
Canadian studies have reached similar conclusions. In 2014, Media 
Smarts released its national Canadian survey of nearly 5,500 students from 
Grade 4 to Grade 11 entitled Sexuality and Romantic Relationships in the Digital 
Age.126 According to this study, sexting practices tend to increase with age and 
accessibility to personal cellphones: eight per cent of students in Grades 7–11 
with access to a cellphone have sent a sext of themselves to someone, while nearly 
25 percent of those participants had received a sext.127 Fifteen per cent of students 
120. Ibid at 32.
121. Jeff R Temple & Hyejeong Choi, “Longitudinal Association between Teen Sexting and 
Sexual Behavior” (2014) 134 Pediatrics e1287 at e1287.
122. Sheri Madigan et al., “Prevalence of Multiple Forms of Sexting Behavior among Youth: 
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” (2018) 172 JAMA Pediatrics 327.
123. Lenhart & Duggan, supra note 12. According to Bianca Klettke and her co-authors’ recent 
systematic review of the literature on sexting’s prevalence rates, “both sending and receiving 
sexts is substantially more prevalent amongst adults than adolescents”. Bianca Klettke, David 
J Hallford & David J Mellor, “Sexting Prevalence and Correlates: A Systematic Literature 
Review” (2014) 34 Clinical Psychol Rev 44 at 48-9.
124. Madigan et al., supra note 122.
125. Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting: How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending Sexually 
Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images via Text Messaging (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, 2009); See also Yara Barrense-Dias et al., “Sexting and the Definition Issue” (2017) 
61 J Adolescent Health 544. 
126. Valerie Steeves, Sexuality and Romantic Relationships in the Digital Age, Phase 3: Young 
Canadians in a Wired World (Ottawa: MediaSmarts, 2014), online: <http://mediasmarts.ca/
ycww/sexuality-romantic-relationships-digital-age>.
127. Ibid. 
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in Grade 11 admitted to having sexted at least once, and just under one-quarter 
of the students with access to a cellphone who have sent a sext of themselves 
reported that the person who received the sext forwarded it to someone else.128 
Of the twenty-four per cent of students in Grades 7–11 with cellphones who 
have received a sext from its creator, fifteen per cent forwarded it to someone 
else. The findings of this study also indicate that, “although boys and girls are 
equally likely to create a sext, older students in general, and boys in particular, 
are more likely to receive them and forward them to others,” yet “sexts of boys 
are more likely to be forwarded than sexts of girls.”129 Furthermore, the majority 
of participants admitted to sexting regardless of the household rules set by their 
parents, which suggests that teens may continue to sext regardless of whether 
adults deem it socially acceptable.130 The findings of Media Smarts study are 
in line with research on teenaged sexting coming out of the United States, 
such as Bianca Klettke, David Hallford, and David Mellor’s systematic review 
of the literature.131 Additional evidence reveals that, across all age groups, the 
proportion of cellphone owners that say that they have sent and received sexual 
or nude pictures has increased over time.132 Statistically significant increases 
between 2012 and 2014 demonstrate that this expressive practice is growing in 
prevalence and importance.133 
Klettke and co-authors’ 2014 review of the sexting literature, as well as 
Livingstone and Smith’s review of research published evaluating the harms 
experienced by child users of online and mobile technologies since 2008, conclude 
that mobile and online risks are increasingly intertwined with pre-existing 
(offline) risks in children’s lives.134 For instance, Livingstone and Smith found 
that the risks of cyberbullying, contact with strangers, sexual messaging and 
pornography generally affect fewer than one in five adolescents who frequent 
the Internet. “Prevalence estimates”, they suggest, “vary according to definition 
and measurement, but do not appear to be rising substantially with increasing 
access to mobile and online technologies, possibly because these technologies 




131. Klettke, Hallford & Mellor, supra note 122 at 45.
132. Lenhart & Duggan, supra note 12. 
133. Ibid at 18.
134. Klettke, Hallford, Mellor, supra note 122; Sonia Livingstone & Peter K Smith, “Annual 
Research Review: Harms experienced by child users of online and mobile technologies: The 
nature, prevalence and management of sexual and aggressive risks in the digital age” (2014) 
55 J Child Psychol & Psychiatry 635.
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commensurate growth in safety awareness and initiatives.”135 They go on to state, 
“To those who find it implausible that new technologies have not increased the 
risk of harm in children’s lives, it is worth noting that, over the period when 
internet and mobile use have risen sharply, long-term measures of harm to 
children reveal little or no increase over recent years, and some reductions in 
bullying and victimization.”136
III. FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE TERRAIN: 
NEW INTIMATE IMAGES LAWS
Fundamental shifts in the legislative terrain include debates about the applicability 
of child pornography offences to youths’ self-created and shared digital sexual 
imagery. These developments raise significant questions about the scope of the 
private use exception and the constitutionality of our child pornography laws 
more broadly. In 2012, federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible 
for justice and public safety struck a subcommittee to identify potential gaps 
in the Criminal Code related to the non-consensual distribution of “intimate 
images” of both adults and youths. The Coordinating Committee of Senior 
Officials’ Cybercrime Working Group (CCSO CWG) released their report the 
following June.137 In it, they advanced a definition of an intimate image, which, 
they acknowledged, would constitute child pornography if the person depicted 
was less than eighteen years of age. This definition, they write,138
raises questions as to what options should be available to deal with an adult or young 
offender who may have distributed an intimate image of a person who is under the 
age of 18. Should the offender be charged with a child pornography offence? Or 
should the police and/or Crown have the option of proceeding under the proposed 
new offence, which would be a less serious and less stigmatizing offence? 
On 20 November 2013, Minister of Justice Peter MacKay introduced 
Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Canada Evidence Act, the 
Competition Act, and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 
in the House of Commons.139 The Bill integrates most of the CCSO CWG’s 
recommendations and creates a new Criminal Code offence (section 162.1) of 
135. Livingstone & Smith, supra note 134 at 645-46.
136. Ibid.
137. CCSO CWG, supra note 32.
138. Ibid at 18.
139. Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Canada Evidence Act, the Competition 
Act, and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 (first 
reading 20 November 2013); SC 2014, c 31. 
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knowingly  publishing, distributing, transmitting, selling, making available, 
or advertising an “intimate image” of a person without the consent of the person 
depicted within. The definition of “intimate image” for the purposes of the new 
provision includes materials that are captured by the child pornography laws.140 
Notably, consent to distribution is a defence in the new intimate images law and 
thus seems to support the broader interpretation of “private use” set out by Justice 
Manderscheid in Keough.141 As such, with the development of this new provision, 
the legislature implicitly acknowledges that a teen can consent to transmitting or 
distributing intimate images of him or herself to another teen, including a teen 
who did not “participate” in the image’s creation. The only restriction imposed 
is that an intimate image cannot be non-consensually sent to a third party. Also 
of note is that the new hybrid offence is punishable on indictment by up to five 
years of imprisonment or, upon summary conviction, to a fine of not more than 
$5,000 and/or six months of imprisonment. The penalty for child pornography, 
also a hybrid offence, however, includes mandatory minimum sentence of between 
ninety days and one year depending on the charge, mandatory registration as a 
sex offender, compliance with a DNA bank order, and the stigma of a child 
pornography conviction.142
The CCSO CWG acknowledges a reluctance by the members of the 
provincial and territorial Public Prosecution Service of Canada to lay any child 
140. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 162.1(2). Section 162.1(2) includes the following: 
Intimate image means a visual recording of a person made by any means including a 
photographic, film or video recording,
(a)  in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her 
breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity;
(b)  in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that gave rise to 
a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(c)  in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at 
the time the offence is committed.is defined as a visual recording (as opposed to written 
materials or audio recordings, for example) by means of a photographic, film or video 
recording. It must be of a person: in the nude; or exposing his or her genital organs or anal 
region or breasts; or engaged in explicit sexual activity.
141. Bill C-13 does not add the new offence to s 150.1 of the Criminal Code, which outlines 
the sexual offences for which consent is not a defence as well as the rules relating to age of 
consent. Julia Nicol & Dominique Valiquet, Legal and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary: Bill C-13: An Act to Amend 
the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Publication no. 41-2-C13-E (11 December 2013, revised 
28 August 2014).
142. Nicol & Valiquet, ibid at 6–7.
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pornography charges in non-consensual distribution cases involving consensually 
created images depicting persons under eighteen years of age: “In their view, 
the harm resulting from the non-consensual distribution of intimate images 
(i.e., breach of privacy) is qualitatively different from the harm resulting from 
the distribution of child pornography (i.e., sexual exploitation of children).”143 
Whereas a major objective of child pornography laws is to protect children from 
sexual abuse in the making of child pornography, to protect children who have 
been abused from further harm via the consumption of their abuse images, and to 
protect children by preventing the fueling of fantasies and facilitation the sexual 
solicitation of children, the new “intimate images” law constructs the harms of 
this same materials in terms of humiliation, reputational damage, emotional, 
physical and economic fallout.144
Other members of the CCSO CWG expressed the view that the child 
pornography provisions were not designed to address non-consensual distribution: 
“The prevalence of this activity among young adults and youth has been fueled 
by the growth in social media and it is becoming increasingly evident that these 
types of cases are being dealt with differently by police, Crown and the courts than 
143. Ibid. For more on this see Sarah Wastler, “Harm in Sexting: Analyzing the Constitutionality 
of Child Pornography Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession, 
and Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by Teenagers” (2010) 33 The. Harv. 
JL & Gender 687.
144. CCSO CWG, supra note 32. Notably, the harms that may flow from non-consensual 
distribution of consensually produced sexts are not entirely distinct from the physical, 
emotional, and psychological consequences that may flow from the dissolution of off-line 
sexual romances and distribution of sexual rumours. Furthermore, greater acknowledgement 
of the complex relationship between sexting and the development of mental health issues and 
suicide is necessary. In one interview regarding a high profile sexting and cyberbullying case, 
Amada Todd’s mother, Carol, is quoted as saying: 
“Amanda’s story, when you look at all the different pieces, it’s very complicated,” Todd said 
from her home in Port Coquitlam, B.C., adding that her daughter had a learning disability 
that affected her coping skills. “I don’t really like it when they say Amanda was cyberbullied to 
death. That wasn’t the case and I don’t think there’s enough supports for kids for mental health 
issues, which is ultimately why they take their own lives. 
 Alison Auld, “Link between Cyberbullying and Teen Suicides Oversimplified: Experts, 
Parents.” Global News (15 December 2013), online: <http://globalnews.ca/news/1031407/
link-between-cyberbullying-and-teen-suicides-oversimplified-experts-parents/>. For more 
on this complex relation see: Wayne MacKay, “Respectful and Responsible Relationships: 
There’s No App for That - The Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and 
Cyberbullying” (2012), online:<http://www.unlikecyberbullying.ca/sites/default/files/
downloads/cyberbullyingtaskforcereportmarch22.pdf> at 105; Panagiota Korenis & Stephan 
Bates Billick, “Forensic Implications: Adolescent Sexting and Cyberbullying” (2014) 85 
Psychiatric Q 97 at 101.
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‘typical child pornography cases.’”145 This claim has significant bearing for the 
constitutional status of consensually created and shared images and the scope of the 
private use exception. Moreover, it has significant implications for contemporary 
policing and child protection initiatives. Any anti-sexting campaigns initiated by 
police agencies or federally funded child protection agencies should be updated 
immediately so that they are not in direct contradiction to the law.
Some federal representatives of the CCSO CWG expressed concerns that the 
broad scope of child pornography offences may be questioned if cases involving 
older teens are being more often resolved by resorting to the proposed intimate 
images offence. Indeed, this broad scope should be questioned in light of the 
developments outlined above and in the following sections of this article. Even the 
staunchest child protectionists and critics of the freedom of expression argument 
advanced in Sharpe have argued that youth who create sexual images of themselves 
“are not in actual fact in possession of child pornography notwithstanding 
the definition in the Canadian criminal code” and that the oppression of the 
minor is clearly missing when non-exploitative conditions prevail.146 The new 
intimate image provision thus captures the same self-produced materials as our 
child pornography laws yet reclassifies this imagery, redefines its harms, and 
subsequently reduces its sentences. The implication of this for expanding the 
private use exception’s scope is significant.
Relatedly, it should be noted that the harms of defining child pornography 
broadly and imprecisely also concern those working in the field of child protection 
and child sexual abuse. Advocating for more specific and clear terminology 
when defining sexual representations of children and youth, Jennifer Martin 
145. CCSO CWG supra note 32 at 18. The authors cite R v Walsh (2006), 208 OAC 42 at para 
60. This case involves a twenty-three-year-old man who distributed sexual photographs of his 
fifteen-year-old former girlfriend to at least one friend, leading to further distribution to her 
school community and family.
146. Sonja Grover, “Oppression of Children Intellectualized as Free Expression under the 
Canadian Charter: A Reanalysis of the Sharpe Possession of Child Pornography Case” (2004) 
11:4 Intl J Child Rts 311 at 317. It should be noted, however, that Grover suggests these 
youth “need to be assessed by Child Welfare to determine whether there are or are not child 
protection concerns, rather than being held criminally liable for expressing their sexuality” 
and that their depictions and written materials ought to be considered unlawful because of 
the risk they pose to other children who may be victimized if the images are used by others 
to groom them. Grover also argues that if it is found that the depictions held by minors 
“involve coercion of one child by another, for instance an older child against a younger 
child, or even one peer against another, the material would then also become, on the view 
expressed here, a category of child pornography this time produced by children themselves.” 
at 330, note 1.
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and Ramona Alaggia note how issues of language are not merely semantic.147 
Referring to images of child sexual abuse and exploitation as child pornography 
rather than as child sexual abuse images online (CSAIO), they argue, has 
negative social and legal consequences. Using the term child pornography 
when referring to CSAIO “may contribute to detachment and to a degree of 
disconnection from the egregious nature of the material,” and they note that 
“[s]ome argue that the term child pornography distorts the serious nature of 
child victimization when used in reference to sexual abuse images of children 
because it implies conventional pornography with a child subject and, as such, 
conveys the impression of consensual activity.”148 Imprecise language similarly 
has implications for how we respond culturally and legally to adolescents’ 
digital produced and shared sexual images. Referring to these as images child 
pornography gives rise to myriad concerns about the violation of young peoples’ 
constitutionally protected expressive rights and to their potential criminalization 
as child pornographers. 
IV. SHIFTING PRIVACY AND COMMUNICATION NORMS: 
NETWORKED PRIVACY, THE CONTROL PARADOX, AND 
AN UPDATED PRIVACY CALCULUS
Privacy is one of the key elements of the private use exception as well as one of 
the key issues of our time. And, yet, “there is little consensus regarding what 
privacy is and when it has been violated.”149 This is complicated further by new 
technologies that have significantly increased the volume of data that is now 
being (self )-produced, widely and rapidly shared, infinitely stored, aggregated, 
and subsequently subjected to powerful algorithms for future use by individuals, 
corporations, and the state.150 Given the centrality of privacy to the exception, 
its meaning, parameters, and the safeguards required to protect and regulate it in 
our digital context begs further consideration. 
147. Jennifer Martin & Ramona Alaggia, “Sexual Abuse Images in Cyberspace: Expanding the 
Ecology of the Child” (2013) 22 J Child Sexual Abuse 398 at 398.
148. Ibid at 407.
149. Laura Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill 
LJ 165 at 168. 
150. See danah boyd’s discussion of the ease with which data can be recorded and archived, 
copied, shared with large audiences, accessed by others, and found in the future. 
danah boyd, It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014).
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Nearly a decade has passed since Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg was 
misquoted as claiming that “privacy is no longer a social norm.”151 Since then, 
US and Canadian scholars and courts have clarified that privacy remains a widely 
maintained value but that it is experienced differently in a digital context. Leading 
technology and social media scholars, danah boyd and Alice Marwick, have 
consistently found that “people care deeply about privacy and develop innovative 
strategies to achieve privacy while participating in the systems that allow them 
to access information, socialize with friends, and interact with contemporary 
entertainment platforms.”152 boyd has influentially argued that new information 
and communication technologies have blurred the boundary between public and 
private, resulting in, what she calls, “networked privates” and “networked publics” 
with diverse influences on individuals’ concerns and their decisions regarding 
privacy.153 These networks have come about in part because the properties of 
digital technology and social media have made creating boundaries around these 
online spaces far more difficult.154 As boyd notes, most social networking sites 
are structured on the principle of “public by default, private through effort.”155 
Consequently, young people who have active social lives online have been found 
to “shy away from the conventional binary model which sees information as either 
open or secret, safe to share or unsafe,” preferring instead “to manage disclosure 
by sharing deliberately selected pieces of information based on audience and 
context”156 and to purposefully anonymize their images by excluding identifying 
features or contexts. The next section reconsiders the meaning of “private use” 
in a digital culture wherein one’s belief in control is paradoxical, contexts collapse, 
and images are increasingly taking the place of words. 
151. Bobbie Johnson, “Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,” The Guardian 
(11 January 2010), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/
facebook-privacy>.
152. Alice E Marwick & danah boyd, “Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context 
in Social Media” (2014) 16 New Media & Society 1051; Alice E Marwick, Claire Fontaine 
& danah boyd, “Nobody Sees It, Nobody Gets Mad: Social Media, Privacy, and Personal 
Responsibility among Low-SES Youth” (2017) 3 Social Media & Soc’y 1. 
153. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150; see also Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti & 
George Loewenstein, “Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox” (2012) 4 
Soc Psychol & Personality Sci 340.
154. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150 at 47.
155. Ibid at 61.
156. Sonia Livingstone, “Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers’ 
Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-Expression” (2008) 10 New 
Media & Society 393; Karaian & van Meyl, supra note 23.
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A. CONTROL AND ITS PARADOXES
In the literature on privacy, one’s protection of one’s privacy often depends on 
the degree of control they are able to maintain, so much so that “privacy itself is 
often defined as the control over personal information flows.”157 As the case law 
outlined above reveals, the Supreme Court of Canada and subsequent judicial 
interpretations of the private use exception associate the prevention of future 
harm to one’s self and to other children with “maintaining privacy” and with 
“maintaining control.”158 The issue of control is raised in Keough, where Justice 
Manderscheid found that the “third-party possession private use exception 
is always negated where possession is: (1) without the consent of all persons 
recorded … (4) results in the loss of control of the private use material,”159 adding 
that “effective control is lost when … the ‘owners’ of the private use materials are 
unable to demand the return of the materials or their destruction.”160 It is also 
reiterated in Barabash, despite not being central to the fact scenario under 
consideration by the court.161
Given fundamental shifts in technology and the social and sexual context 
in which nudes are produced, distributed, and interpreted, emphasizing the 
“maintenance of control” as a ground for constitutional protection and a means 
of preventing harm to other children has become increasingly untenable. The 
affordances of digital technology—the ease, speed, and scope with which sexual 
imagery can be created, recorded, copied, archived, shared, and searched, 
as is referenced in more recent case law—evidences the near impossibility of 
maintaining control.162 Moreover, while privacy and control of one’s images 
remain a high priority for young people and adults alike, digital technology 
has altered communication and sexual norms in such a way that to opt out of, 
or abstain from, digital sexual expression is less and less a viable choice for many 
individuals, despite knowledge of its risks. 
Evidence of young peoples’ attempts to manage their privacy is demonstrated 
by shifts in usage over time. In 2008, Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman, and Nicholas 
157. Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein, supra note 153 at 341 [citations omitted]. 
158. R v Keough, supra note 20 at para 192.
159. Ibid at para 71.
160. Ibid.
161. R v Barabash, supra note 31 at para 27.
162. R v Keough, supra note 20.
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Christakis found that 33 percent of teenagers used privacy controls.163 By 2012, 
however, 60 percent of teens were using “friends only” filters, and 25 percent 
restricted their communication to “friends of friends.”164 This is demonstrated 
further by teens’ move away from Facebook to newer platforms such as 
Snapchat—a mobile messaging application released in 2012—that provide 
private channels for communication between smaller groups of friends.165 Paul 
Hodkinson argues that while some teenagers’ content remains fully public, 
including users of platforms such as Twitter that do not offer friends-only 
controls, “there may be a direction of travel among teens towards friends-only 
communication as default where it is available.”166
While the management of privacy online by teens affords a degree of “control 
over how information flows, who has access to it, and in what context,” the 
possibility of full control has been called into question by technology experts 
such as Microsoft researcher danah boyd.167 In her research on youths’ integration 
of technology into their everyday practices, boyd argues that, in a networked age, 
“[a]ny model of privacy that focuses on the control of information will fail.”168 
Achieving absolute control, boyd writes,169 
presumes many things that are often untenable. … One slip-up or data leakage 
and whatever was once protected can easily enter into a networked public where 
it may enter broader databases, be aggregated with other data, and circulate. In a 
networked world, data is more persistent, replicable, searchable, and scalable than 
ever before. Trying to achieve perfect control will only lead to frustration. 
Whether as a result of snooping parents, broken-hearted or malicious 
ex-partners, hackers, or the sheer nature of our technological infrastructure, 
legal expectations of complete control are unsustainable and should not preclude 
163. Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman & Nicholas Christakis, “The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis 
of College Student Privacy Settings in an Online Social Network” (2008) 14 J 
Computer-Mediated Comm 79.
164. Mary Madden et al, Social Media, Teens and Privacy (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 
2013), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-socialmedia-and-privacy/>.
165. Emma Velez, “Intimate Publics and Ephemerality, Snapchat: A Case Study,” The Second 
Shift (15 September 2014), online: < http://www.secondshiftblog.com/2014/09/
intimate-publics-and-ephemerality-snapchat-a-case-study/>.
166. Paul Hodkinson, “Bedrooms and Beyond: Youth, Identity and Privacy on Social Network 
Sites” (2017) 19 New Media & Society 272 at 279.
167. Jacqueline Vickery, “‘I Don’t Have Anything to Hide, But…’: The Challenges and 
Negotiations of Social and Mobile Media Privacy for Non-Dominant Youth” (2015) 18 
Information Comm & Soc’y 281 at 282.
168. boyd, supra note 150. 
169. Ibid. 
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consensual teenage sexting from qualifying for constitutional protection as private 
use materials. Even the criminal justice system’s attempts to control private data, 
including court-protected names of young offenders and victims of crime, have 
proven vulnerable to Google search algorithms and hackers.170 
Moreover, the greater sense of privacy and control afforded by new privacy 
measures and applications has raised questions about the paradoxical impact of 
one’s sense of control for online interactions. A growing body of studies from the 
social and behavioural sciences reveal that managing and maintaining privacy 
in our contemporary context is not only more physically difficult but also 
psychologically complex.171 Early research has identified control as a determinant 
of risk perception and risk taking; people are more willing to take risks, and judge 
those risks as less severe, when they feel in control. For instance, one study found 
that participants who were provided with greater explicit control over whether 
and how much of their personal information researchers could publish ended 
up sharing more sensitive information with a broader audience—the opposite 
of the ostensible purpose of providing such control.172 Research thus shows 
that a greater sense of control can paradoxically reduce privacy concern, which, 
in turn, can have unintended effects.173 According to Brandimarte, Acquisti, 
and Loewenstein’s study, people who experience more perceived control over 
limited aspects of privacy sometimes respond by revealing more information (less 
privacy), to the point where they end up being more vulnerable as a result of the 
measures ostensibly meant to protect them.174 
On the other hand, lower perceived control can result in lower disclosure, 
even if the associated risks of disclosure are lower: “In other words, our results 
provide evidence that control over personal information may be a necessary 
(in ethical or normative terms) but not sufficient condition for privacy 
170. Lisa Vaas “12-Year-Old Canadian Boy Admits to Hacking Police and Government 
Sites for Anonymous” (26 October 2013), online: Sophos.com <https://nakedsecurity.
sophos.com/2013/10/26/12-year-old-canadian-boy-admits-to-hacking-police-and-
government-sites-for-anonymous/>; Andrew Duffy, “Google Is Linking Secret, 
Court-Protected Names—including Victim IDs—to Online Coverage,” Ottawa 
Citizen (21 September 2017), online: <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/
google-is-linking-secret-court-protected-names-including-victim-ids-to-online-coverage>. 
171. Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein, supra note 153. Peter Harris, “Sufficient grounds for 
optimism? The relationship between perceived controllability and optimistic bias” (1996) 15 
J Soc & Clinical Psychol 9; Neil Weinstein, “Why it won’t happen to me: Perceptions of risk 
factors and susceptibility” (1984) 14 Health Psychol 431.
172. Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein ibid at 341. 
173. Ibid at 346 [citations omitted].
174. Ibid at 340.
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protection.”175 Brandimarte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein label this complexity 
the “control paradox.” The development of more privacy control may allow 
users of person-to-person photo-sharing applications to share more sensitive 
information with larger, and possibly riskier, audiences.176 For example, early 
adopters (primarily youth) of Snapchat believed the application’s promise to 
“disappear” their images or videos (or “snaps”) within seconds of them being 
received, thus preventing the communiqué from being saved and redistributed. 
Snapchat quickly became a popular means of sharing nudes. However, soon 
after its widespread adoption, Snapchat’s promise to erase images and inform 
senders if a screenshot had been taken was revealed to be false.177 If we assume 
that the future of data is networked and that we can no longer rely on control 
of data to achieve privacy, it becomes imperative to look for alternate models for 
understanding youths’ right to express their sexuality. As boyd notes,178 
[t]he challenges of networked privacy are not new issues, but social media and 
networked culture magnifies them in significant ways. The data that underpins 
networked sociality and algorithmic life connects people across numerous axes 
time and time again. The future is only going to be more networked, more 
interwoven, more of a gnarly hairball that’s impossible to untangle without harsh 
cleaving. Expecting that people can assert individual control when their lives are so 
interconnected is farcical. Moreover, it reinforces the power of those who already 
have enough status and privilege to meaningfully assert control over their own 
networks. 
B. CONTEXT COLLAPSE
If we cannot rely on control to achieve privacy in a networked age, how then 
can we think about privacy as it pertains to one’s intimate images and videos? 
Drawing on Helen Nissenbaum, boyd argues that we need to understand privacy 
in context but that we must also recognize how digital technologies result in 
“context collapse.”179 Privacy norms exist in a dialectic relationship with our 
technological, social, sexual, and legal terrain. They also differ between nations and 
within communities, depending on the specific context, one’s subject position, 
175. Ibid at 345.
176. Ibid. 
177. Nicole A Poltash, “Snapchat and Sexting: A Snapshot of Baring Your Bare Essentials” (2013) 
19 Rich JL & Tech 14.
178. boyd, supra note 150 at 350.
179. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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and the nature of the relationship between people in any given interaction.180 The 
assumption that all people understand, experience, and achieve privacy equally, 
particularly as it relates to marginalized subjects such as youth, and to collapsing 
contexts, begs further acknowledgement in law, more generally, and in child 
pornography law, more specifically.181 
One of the primary points established across boyd’s work is that, while 
“networked publics” share certain features with bedrooms, park, schools and 
shopping malls, they differ substantively from physical public spaces with respect 
to how difficult it is for young people to control access to themselves and their 
content.182 Social networking platforms, including mobile applications, are less 
restricted in terms of form and function than material places.183 Facebook or 
Snapchat for example, often brings together individuals from different contexts—
college friends, siblings, old school friends, work colleagues and others—and 
such a diverse audience may make it difficult for individuals to grasp the context 
in which they are operating and/or to present an effective, coherent, and nuanced 
impression of themselves.184 For boyd, then, young people’s attempts to establish 
themselves socially and make sense of their place in the world are taking place in 
an environment in which control over the reach of what they share is an ongoing 
battle.185 Social worlds regularly “collide uncontrollably” in online spaces where 
sharing publicly becomes established as a default approach, and the achievement 
of greater privacy requires extensive vigilance.186 Such a situation, boyd argues, 
inverts the norms of socialization in physical spaces, where interactions are 
usually restricted to small, visible groups. 
The assumption that digital contexts are stable across space and time also 
requires re-evaluation. As Goodwin and co-authors note, social networking 
180. Ibid. 
181. Alice E Marwick & danah boyd, “Understanding Privacy at the Margins: Introduction” 
(2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1157 at 1159.
182. Kath Albury “Just because it’s public doesn’t mean it’s any of your business: Adults’ 
and children’s sexual rights in digitally mediated spaces” (2017) 19 New Media & 
Soc’y 713 at 720.
183. Brady Robards, “Mediating Experiences of ‘Growing Up’ on Facebook’s Timeline: Privacy, 
Ephemerality and the Reflexive Project of Self ” in Andy Bennett & Brady Robards, eds, 
Mediated Youth Cultures: The Internet, Belonging and New Cultural Configurations (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 26.
184. Hodkinson, supra note 166 at 278.
185. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150.
186. Kate Raynes-Goldie, “Aliases, Creeping, and Wall Cleaning: Understanding Privacy in the 
Age of Facebook” (2010) 15 First Monday 36.
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sites problematize context, leading users to grapple with how to manage 
contextual integrity:187 
With developments in digital technology there is a potential loss of control over the 
context in which such texts are read, re-read and shared (potentially ad infinitum). 
The meanings subsequently made of the behaviour, possibly years after the fact, 
can be radically different from those of the user’s peer group, and the potential 
consequences not always positive. … The threat posed by such forms of “context 
collapse” is particularly heightened for youth pursuing online activities that sit 
outside dominant social norms. 
Loss of control over context has contemporary and future criminal 
implications for teenage sexters and sext recipients. Innocently swiping through 
one’s pictures with a friend and accidentally exposing them to a nude you took or 
received in the context of an earlier sexual exchange would theoretically subject 
you to distribution charges. Similarly, while a sixteen-year-old’s sext may remain 
fixed across time, the context in which this image is possessed will change over 
time and established norms and meanings can collapse. A teenage girl’s ownership 
of her then teenage girlfriend’s sext, ten years after she received it and post the 
dissolution of their relationship, may result in her being viewed as possessing 
child pornography, even in the absence of her ex-girlfriend’s exploitation or abuse.
Research with youth finds that, while many young people are aware of 
risks related to their online activities, they see the compromise of their privacy 
as unavoidable, even imperative, in order to connect with peers online and to 
acquire social and personal benefits through accessing social network sites.188 
Accessing sexual benefits are no different. Thus, for adults and young people 
alike, being overly concerned with privacy can result in digital exclusion and 
sexual abstinence. For the majority of people, such exclusion is undesired and 
untenable, resulting in a shift towards privacy pragmatism rather than a lack 
of concern about privacy.189 Research in this area demonstrates that people “are 
concerned about their privacy but are willing to trade some of it for something 
beneficial.”190 Niki Fritz and Amy Gonzales draw from privacy calculus theory, 
which frames online information provision as a trade off for economic or 
187. Ian Goodwin et al, “Ending Up Online: Interrogating Mediated Youth Drinking Cultures” 
in Andy Bennett & Brady Robards, eds, Mediated Youth Cultures: The Internet, Belonging and 
New Cultural Configurations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 59 at 62. 
188. Priscilla Regan & Valerie Steeves, “Kids R Us: Online Social Networking and the Potential 
for Empowerment” (2010) 8 Surveillance & Soc’y 151.
189. Raynes-Goldie, supra note 185 at 193.
190. Ibid.
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social benefits.191 Again the inclusion of sexual benefits can be implied by the 
latter category. 
A privacy calculus approach decides whether to disclose information, weighing 
both the perceived benefits and the justification for data. Fritz and Gonzales 
consider privacy to be relative rather than simply present or absent, important 
or unimportant. Such a nuanced approach to privacy attitudes interrogates how 
participants come to the choices they make vis-à-vis disclosure or concealment 
rather than attempting to measure a nebulous privacy concern.192 Fully grasping 
this privacy calculus in the digital age requires an acknowledgement of the fact 
that youth have always, and successfully if given the right tools, balanced the 
benefits of engaging in sexual activity and speech against its risks. It also requires 
a consideration of the ways in which sexual images have, to some extent, come to 
replace acts and words. This latter consideration is discussed below.
C. SHIFTING COMMUNICATION NORMS
How and why control is “lost” in the digital context can be explained in part by 
how digital technology has altered communication norms. While some of the 
earliest legal writing about teenage sexting analogized the practice to modern-day 
love letters,193 the acknowledgement of the role that images have come to play in 
young people’s romantic lives is equally important. Indeed, according to Rebecca 
Venema and Katharina Lobinger, digital images are the same as words for young 
people (insert surprised-face emoji here).194 They constitute “visual conversations” 
or a form of “visual texting.” Teens, it has been found, routinely refer to the act 
of photo sharing via Snapchat as “sending a message” rather than as “sending a 
photo” and describe their interactions as “chatting through pictures.”195 Placed in 
this framework, loss of control of one’s image can be conceived of as a modern-day 
expression of the sexual rumour mill. A particularly extensive and invasive one, 
but a rumour mill nonetheless. Whereas earlier generations may have written 
or received a love letter or dialled their crush on a landline and engaged in a bit 
of awkward but steamy phone sex, teens today are as likely to go online to rate 
191. Niki Fritz & Amy Gonzales, “Not the Normal Trans Story: Negotiating Trans Narratives 
While Crowdfunding at the Margins” (2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1189.
192. Janaki Srinivasan et al, “The Poverty of Privacy: Understanding Privacy Trade-Offs from 
Identity Infrastructure Users in India” (2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1228.
193. Day, supra note 16.
194. Rebecca Venema & Katharina Lobinger, “‘And Somehow It Ends Up on the Internet’: Agency, 
Trust and Risks in Photo-Sharing among Friends and Romantic Partners” (2017) 22 
First Monday np. 
195. Ibid.
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their crush as “hot,”196 to flirt on Chatroulette,197 or to use Snapchat to send a 
nude photo.198 Technology, it seems—from paper and pens to cellphones and the 
Internet—has always been used by youth to connect, explore, to communicate 
desire, to move things to the next level, and even, sadly, to shame one another for 
these desires and behaviours.
Recipients of love notes, phone calls, online ratings, and now nudes are 
also known to share these technology-facilitated expressions of interest without 
permission. The note is passed around, the phone call is recalled or even possibly 
recorded, the online rating is screen shot, and the nude is forwarded. Motivations 
for doing so are varied and range from getting a laugh, expressing excitement and 
pride, or just plain spitefulness.199 Typically, one does not ask the love-letter writer, 
the caller, the clicker, and, now, the photographer for consent to share their “words.” 
This is the nature of the sexual rumour mill. The rumour mill may be immoral, 
or wrongful, but its status as criminal is questionable and far from inherent. 
Understood in this way, the sharing or distribution of images as words affects 
how we understand privacy and consent with respect to sexual speech. Indeed, 
the sexual rumour mill has always been the source of embarrassment, shame, 
and other sorts of negative, and sometimes serious social and even legal (mainly 
civil law) consequences. The framing of sexual image-based “chats” or “messages” 
between young people via the wide-angle lens of child pornography laws can 
distort their meaning and obscure their relationship to young people’s pre-digital 
sexual speech, as well as to the research that evaluates how communication norms 
have changed with the development of digital technology. Arguing this is in no 
way meant to excuse malicious redistribution of images but rather to recognize 
that how we understand the meaning and boundaries of privacy, control, and 
communication at the heart of the private use exception also has implications for 
non-consensual image sharing.
196. “Hot or Not” Wikipedia, online: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hot_or_Not>.
197. Chatroulette, online: <http://chatroulette.com/>.
198. Marc Beaulieu, “If You’re Not Sexting, You’re in the Minority, Says Science,” 
CBC News (21 August 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/life/wellness/
if-you-re-not-sexting-you-re-in-the-minority-says-science-1.4255499>.
199. Laura Harvey, “Swagger, Ratings and Masculinity: Theorising the Circulation of Social and 
Cultural Value in Teenage Boys’ Digital Peer Networks” (2013) 18 Sociological Res Online 1.
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V. POSITIVE RIGHTS, SEX-POSITIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, 
AND THE VALUE OF SEXUAL PLEASURE
With the creation of the private use exception, the Supreme Court of Canada 
sought to “weigh the costs of the law to freedom of expression against the benefits 
it confers,” specifically, the benefit of protecting other children from harm.200 
The Court concluded that the standard necessary to demonstrate harm was not 
concrete scientific proof but, rather, a standard of “reasoned apprehension of 
harm.”201 They ultimately concluded that the risk of this harm posed by the 
exempted materials was “small, incidental and more tenuous than that associated 
with the vast majority of material [involving sexual abuse and exploitation] 
targeted by s. 163.1(4).”202
In light of digital technology’s effect on privacy, sexual, and communication 
norms, the creation and distribution of youths’ sexual expression is now more 
probable, prominent, and accessible than was likely imagined by the Court in 
2001. This warrants a re-evaluation of the cost-benefit analysis at the heart of our 
child pornography law and the private use exception, particularly a re-evaluation 
of the benefits of this expression for youth. While it has been argued by US legal 
scholars that the consensual distribution of youths’ sexts ought to be equated 
with harm to other children and thus criminalized as child pornography, even 
if this means convicting a large number of youths, this is a rare perspective in 
the literature, if not in US case law. 203 Few works to date have considered the 
relevance of sexual pleasure for obscenity determinations, and even fewer have 
done so in relation to young peoples’ digital sexual expression.204 
To appreciate the affordances of sexual pleasure and digital sexual expression 
for youth, and to adequately weigh the benefits of digital sexual expression 
200. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 101.
201. Ibid at para 85.
202. Ibid at para 100.
203. Mary Graw Leary, “Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to 
Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation.” (2008) 15 Va J Soc Pol’y & L 1.
204. While this article advocates for greater legal attention to pleasure it is also necessary to 
acknowledge how pleasure is mobilized by the state to “responsibilize” citizens for managing 
their risks and selves, and how this can in turn serve as a neo-liberal tool for normalizing 
and governing marginalized populations. Thus, the goal of this article is not to glorify or to 
sanitize pleasure, but to nevertheless advocate for its intrinsic value and its potentially positive 
productive effects. For further discussion of the limits of pleasure see generally Michel 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Random House, 1985). For a discussion of how “acceptable bodily pleasure” has 
historically been accessible only by those deemed reasonable, responsible, productive and 
‘good’ see Pat O’Malley, P & Mariana Valverde, “Pleasure, Freedom and Drugs: The Uses of 
‘Pleasure’ in Liberal Governance of Drug and Alcohol Consumption” 38 Soc 25.
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against its risks, Canadian courts should consider adopting both a positive 
rights framework—one that balances the body’s needs to be free from abuse 
and exploitation with its need for health and pleasure—as well as a sex-positive 
legal framework—one that considers the intrinsic value of sexual pleasure and 
which factors the relevance of sexual pleasure into legal determinations of 
constitutionally protected speech.205 
To date, the legal regulation of sex and sexual expression primarily seeks to 
ensure freedom from sexual insecurity, rather than the freedom to access sexual 
information and freedom to experience desired sexual pleasure and expression. 
This positive rights approach has found greater acceptance in global sexual 
and reproductive health policy than in obscenity law, and could better inform 
interpretations of the private use exception and its parameters.206 For instance, 
according to the World Association for Sexual Health (WAS), there is a “growing 
awareness and understanding that ‘pleasure and prevention’ go hand in hand” 
and that “[s]exual health promotion programs for all groups, including youth 
and people with disabilities, should embody the reality that sexual pleasure and 
intimacy are strong motivating factors for sexual behavior [including sexual 
expression] and that sexual pleasure contributes to happiness and well-being.”207 
The WAS Declaration of Sexual Rights thus considers physical, psychological, 
intellectual, and spiritual value of sex and sexual pleasure and advocates for 
service providers to recognize the harms of abstinence [and implicitly criminal] 
responses to youth sexuality.208 Moreover, WAS declares that sexual rights are 
integral to universal human rights and enumerates all peoples’ rights to sexual 
pleasure, emotional sexual expression, and the right to associate freely. Sexual 
expression here is defined as the “right to express [one’s] sexuality through 
communication, touch, emotional expression and love.”209 
205. For more on the intrinsic value of sexual pleasure see: Michel Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Gayle Rubin “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical 
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” in Carol Vance, ed, Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1992) 267-319; Margot Kaplan, “Sex Positive Law” (2014) 89 
NYU L Rev 89 at 150. 
206. World Association for Sexual Health, Sexual Health for the Millennium: A Declaration and 
Technical Document (Minneapolis: World Association for Sexual Health, 2008). 
207. Ibid at 8.
208. Ibid.
209. Ibid at 155.
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Legal and political scholars have argued that a positive rights framework 
should be extended to youth210 and to youths’ digital sexual expression,211 and that 
the latter right be extended despite the impossibility of complete privacy in the 
digital age. Albury, for example, argues that youths’ digital sexual rights cannot be 
“contingent on complete privacy since the capacity for ‘spreadability’ (or copying 
and sharing) is an intrinsic aspect of contemporary digital culture. ... For adults to 
insist that young people only have sexual rights where they are assured of absolute 
privacy can, therefore, be seen as a de facto demand for digital non-participation 
or abstinence.”212 While, as Planned Parenthood notes, “[p]ublic discourse about 
the physiological and psychosocial health benefits of sexual expression has been 
almost entirely absent,”213 there is a growing body of research “demonstrating 
that sexual expression may have health benefits for improving quality of life and 
self-esteem and for reducing stress, depression and suicide.”214
The relevance of a sex-positive, pleasure acknowledging, legal framework for 
conceptualizing and responding to youths’ digital sexual expression is further 
reinforced by Kaplan’s critique of the devaluing of sexual pleasure in “several areas 
of law central to how we experience sex and sexual pleasure” such as obscenity 
laws. She argues that “accepting the premise that sexual pleasure has intrinsic 
value challenges the organizing principles of these areas of law and requires 
us to reexamine our approach to them.”215 Criminal censure of youths’ digital 
expression, would thus require the courts to weigh the risk of the harm occurring, 
the severity of the harm, and the cost of prohibiting the activity. This cost would 
more adequately factor in sexual pleasure for pleasures sake (as it does with other 
speech acts, such as humour, literature, and art), in addition to the role that this 
pleasure plays in youths’ self-actualization, fulfillment, and development of their 
identity.216 As Kaplan argues, “Recognizing and appreciating the value of sexual 
210. Rosalind Petchesky, “Sexual Rights: Inventing a Concept, Mapping an International Practice” 
in Rosalind Parker, Regina Maria Barbosa & Peter Aggleton, eds, Framing the Sexual 
Subject: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality and Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000) 81 at 93.
211. Albury, supra note 181 at 716.
212. Ibid.
213. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, “The Health Benefits of Sexual Expression,” 
White Paper (2007), online: <http://www.plannedparenthood.org>.
214. Ibid.
215. See Kaplan, supra note 205 at 92. Notably, for Kaplan, “sexual pleasure” is not limited to 
physical sexual relations but rather refers to ‘physical and psychological enjoyment that is 
interpreted as sexual or erotic by the individual experiencing it. Ibid at 94.
216. In this way, Kaplan undermines the idea that sex and sexual expression is only valuable if it 
has some added value-such as medical or artistic.
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pleasure enriches our ability to regulate activities that affect said pleasure because 
it requires legislatures and courts to be honest about the trade-offs associated with 
proposed regulation and interference. It yields a more complete assessment of 
the true harms and benefits of the activity we seek to regulate.”217 The failure to 
recognize the applicability of a positive rights, and sex-positive legal framework 
for judicial assessments of youths’ digital sexual expression thus distorts the 
calculus of its harms. Accepting the premise that adolescents are sexual and that 
sexual pleasure and sexual expression has as much intrinsic value for them as it 
does for adults allows us to better acknowledge that a range of adolescent porn, 
like much adult porn, is not obscene and unconstitutional—even if it is not fully 
controlled or maintained as private. 
A more accurate calculation of the harms of teenage sexting also requires 
a more careful analysis of whether the loss of control of one’s sexual images 
poses a reasoned risk of harm to other children. Prevalence rates are helpful 
here. While teenage sexting rates demonstrate the practices is relatively common 
and on the increase, research indicates that there has been a large decline in 
child sexual abuse from 1992 to 2010, post the development of Web 2.0 and 
user generated content.218 Similar trends are noted in the United Kingdom.219 
In the United States, studies show that a very small proportion of sex offences 
against children (under 2 per cent) had an online component.220 The studies on 
online sex offending show that most online offenders are persons who know their 
victims from offline contexts, like school or church, and that the dynamics of 
online and offline offenders are similar.221 With respect to the Court’s concern 
in Sharpe about the use of sexual images to: fuel cognitive distortions about 
children as appropriate sexual partners; groom children for sexual abuse; fuel 
fantasies of pedophiles; and contribute to the market for child pornography, 
again these concerns make more sense when there are large differences in age 
between those in the images, as well as the presence of exploitation and abuse. 
Moreover, as other legal scholars have argued, the harm that stems from the 
illicit circulation of consensually produced sexts is different from the harm that 
217. Kaplan, supra note 205 at 151.
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arises via the circulation of child pornography.222 Finally, concerns about sexting’s 
impact on the market for child pornography are overstated: 
In both contexts, the market is usually a secretive enclave, closed to all except for 
members of an in-group. However, there are social and technological differences 
between the two markets. For child pornographers, the in-group is pedophiles, 
hebephiles, or people with an interest in deviant/paraphilic pornographic material. 
The market is global and is accessed primarily through anonymizing network 
routing processes. For youths who sext, the market typically comprises peers from 
schools or youth programs and is usually limited to local friends. The exchanges 
predominantly occur over cellular networks, directly through texting, or via various 
messaging applications…Because of the relative size and technological savviness of 
youths who sext, illicit markets tend to be small and are shut down easily relative 
to child pornography markets. There is little, if any, evidence demonstrating that 
the two markets ever intersect. Thus, the likely longevity of the harm in the two 
scenarios is also different. 223 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article demonstrates the myriad ways in which the technological, social, 
sexual, and legal landscape has changed since Sharpe was decided in 2001. Offline 
and online are no longer considered separate and distinct realms that map neatly 
onto real/fake sex or legitimate/illegitimate sexual expression.224 An intimate, 
sexually exploratory exchange between young people is now at least as likely to 
occur across networks of fibre optics as it is in parked cars. In this context, the 
consensual creation and sharing of digital sexual images with a crush, long-term 
partner, or even a complete stranger can serve, for some, as a modern-day love 
letter, flirting, or foreplay. For others, sexting is a precursor to offline sex or 
understood as the practice of safe(r) sex, with a host of benefits and a degree of 
risk, as is the case with off-line sex and expression. Indeed, as research on teenage 
sexting reveals, the creation and distribution of digital sexual images is the new 
norm for many. 
These fundamental shifts, it has been argued, have had significant 
implications for the scope of the private use exception and its applicability to 
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youths’ digital sexual expression.225 More recent interpretations of the exception 
have expanded the definition of “participant” and recognized the role of “digital 
sharing” in our contemporary digital context. This, along with legislative 
rationales for Canada’s new intimate images provisions, has effectively expanded 
the exception’s parameters and extended its applicability to youths’ digitally 
self-created and consensually transmitted pornography.226 However this right has 
also been constrained by judicial decisions requiring that youth maintain the 
ability to control their images, a near impossibility in the digital age. 
Youths’ lack of control over their sexual images has, unfortunately, been 
addressed in Canada via the application of child pornography laws. However, 
even in instances where the sexual image of a youth is redistributed without 
their consent, courts have recognized that the loss of privacy experienced by the 
individual is “a very different issue than what was before the Court in Sharpe.”227 
In R v MB for example, a sixteen-year-old girl was convicted of distributing child 
porn after she shared an image of her boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend with her best 
friend via a cellphone and with the ex-girlfriend via a private Facebook message. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal later found that the trial judge had erred 
when they dismissed M.B.’s submission “that cell phones with cameras did not 
exist when Sharpe was decided, and that the Court could not have foreseen the 
frequency with which adolescents take and share sexual photos of themselves.”228 
This case was heard before the new intimate images laws came into effect and the 
conviction is currently under appeal.
With these developments comes the urgent need for judicial or legislative 
clarification of the private use exception. This may come in the form of an 
appeal; the enumeration of a consensual “sexting” defence to Canada’s child 
pornography provisions; or via a redrafting and narrowing of the definition of 
child pornography in the code so that it captures only those images that stem 
from the sexual abuse and exploitation of an actual child. At the very least, 
child advocates such as the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, federal and 
provincial policing agencies, and future courts need to be made aware of these 
developments so that they can avoid infringing on youths’ constitutional rights. 
For instance, in April of 2019 Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 
David Lametti, announced additional funding in excess of $77,000 to support 
225. For consideration of “fundamental shifts” on the parameters of legal debates, see Canada 
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an anti-sexting campaign that inaccurately describes the consensual creation of 
teenage sexting as “self-exploitation” and as criminal.229 Additional concerns exist 
regarding the improper application of extra-judicial measures to youth (such as 
forced participation in criminal diversion programs where no crimes have been 
committed) or the charging of youth with child pornography provisions in 
instances of “intimate image” distribution, as seen with the recent charging of 
a fourteen-year-old Winnipeg boy with child pornography offences.230 Teaching 
youth they do not have to right to digital sexual expression or charging them 
as child pornographers in non-consensual distribution cases distorts not only 
our perceptions of young people’s sexuality and sexual expression, but also our 
understanding of child pornography as a legal category. Ultimately, we need to be 
more creative and respond to violations of trust and privacy in a more measured 
and extra-legal manner, even if these violations deeply offend or cause relational, 
emotional, and economic distress. 
Moving forward, policing agencies, child advocates, and the courts should 
better consider Article 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child which states that “the child shall have the right to freedom of expression” 
and that this “includes through any other media of the child’s choice.”231 
Of course, as Alisdair Gillespie notes, this right must be read in conjunction with 
other articles such as Article 3(c) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which requires “‘as a minimum’ that producing, distributing, 
disseminating ... child pornography constitutes a criminal offence,”232 as well as 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which finds that “all 
forms of expression are capable of protection,” and which proclaims that any 
overruling of this guarantee must be “proportionate.”233 The evidence provided 
throughout this article suggests that the application of child pornography laws 
with regard to consensual, as well as most non-consensual distribution contexts, 
does not adequately and proportionately respond to youths’ digital sexual speech, 
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even to their malicious speech. Future calculations of the affordances and harms 
of youths’ digital sexual expression require a more progressive and nuanced 
analysis of shifting privacy and communication norms, as well as a sex-positive 
analysis of the value of sexual pleasure for youth and the role of digital technology 
in their contemporary social and sexual relations. 
